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The Rule in Ginyard's Case-
Congressional Intent or Judicial Field Expedient?
CAPTAIN WILLIAM A. WOODRUFF, USA
IN RECENT YEARS the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over ser-
vicemen and women has received considerable attention from both
the military and civilian courts.' Much of this attention has centered
around whether or not a particular offense was sufficiently "service
connected" to justify a criminal trial without the full application of the
Bill of Rights.2 But service connection is not the sole criteria for
This article was prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
Army Judge Advocate General's Graduate Course, Army Judge Advocate
General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia.
Captain Woodruff (B.A., University of Alabama: J. D. Magna Cum Laude,
University of South Carolina) is currently serving as Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate, Fort Gordon, Georgia. He is a member of the bars of the states of
Alabama and South Carolina and is admitted to practice before the Supreme
Courts of Alabama and South Carolina, the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, the Fourth United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Fifth United States Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United
States Court of Militaiy Appeals.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Muniz, I M.J. 151 (C.M.A. 1975); United States v. Russo, I M. 134
(CM.A. 1975): United States v. Burden, I M.J. 89, {C.M.A. 1975); United States v. Barrett, I M.J. 74
(C.M.A. 1975): United States v. Hedlund, 2 M.J. II (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. McCarthy. 2 M.J.
26 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Wilson, 2 M.J. 24 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Lazzaro, 2 M.J.
76 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Gladue, 4 MJ. I (C.M.A. 1977); Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S.
355 (1971): O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973);
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974).
See generally Hodgson, Limiting Court-Martial Jurisdiction: A Continuing Process, 20 A.F.L. REV.
256 (1978).
2. "1 Clases arising in the land or naval forces" are excepted from the constitutional requirement of
a grand jury indictment. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971), the
Supreme Court set forth the following twelve factors to be considered in determining if a particular
offense was sufficiently "service connected" to fall within Congress' authority to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" (U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 14). and thus be
within the jurisdiction of a military court-martial:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a foreign
country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming from the war
power.
6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties and the crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military property.
12. The offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.
Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 365 (1971).
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military jurisdiction.3 In addition to committing a service-connected
offense, the accused must be in a status in which he is subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.). 4 Article 2(1) of the Code
provides that all "members of a regular component of the armed
forces, including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their
3. See generally W. WINTHROP. MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS ch. VIII (2d rev. ed. 1920); H.
MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY §§ 1-200 to -508 (1972); Uniform Code of Military Justice art.
2; 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1976).
4. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976)(originally enacted as Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107)
[hereinafter referred to as the Code or U.C.M.J.I. Becoming effective May 31, 1951, the U.C.M.J.
marked the first time in U.S. military history that the military justice systems of the various branches
of the armed forces operated under a uniform statutory scheme. Prior to the Code's enactment, each
of the services operated its justice system under separate, although similar, statutory provisions.
The first statutory framework for military justice in the United States was provided by the Articles of
War adopted on June 30, 1775, by the Continental Congress and based on existing British military
law. Some five months later Congress enacted the Rules for theRegulation of the Navy of the United
Colonies, again relying on the established British naval law. The Articles of War and the Rules for
the Regulation of the Navy (later designated Articles for the Government of the Navy) underwent
many independent revisions before finally being repealed in favor of the unitary scheme embodied in
the U.C.M.J. Extensive literature exists on the development of military law, both pre- and post-Code.
Among the most notable are WINTHROP, supra note 3 (considered the classic treatise on early military
law, originally published in two volumes in 1886); W. AYCOCK & S. WURFEL. MILITARY LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (1955): G. DAVIS. A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1915). A useful bibliography on military law is found in Molt,
Hartnett, & Morton, A Survey of the Literature of Military Law-A Selective Bibliography, 6 VAND.
L. REV. 333 (1953). Publications dealing with more recent developments in the statutory basis of
military law, specifically the Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335, include
Douglass, TheJudicialization of Military Courts, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 213(1971); Mounts & Sugarman,
The Miltarv Justice Act of 1968. 55 A.B.A.J. 470 (1969): Sherman, The Civilianizat ion of Military
Law. 22 ME. L. REV. 3.59-1031970). In addition to providing the substantive criminal law for the mili-
tary, the Code establishes procedures for review of court-martial convictions by both military and civil-
ian judges. Created by U.C.M.J. art. 67; 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1976), the Court of Military Appeals (C.M.A.)
consists ol three civilian judges, appointed by the President for fifteen-year terms, and is the highest
court in the military appellate system. The court must review cases in which the sentence as affirmed
by a court of military review (C.M.R.) affects a general or flag officer or imposes the death penalty.
Id. art. 67(b)( 1); 10 U.C.S. § 867(b)( 1(1976). The court must also hear cases previously reviewed by a
court of military review when review is requested by the judge advocate general of that branch of the
armed forces. Id. art. 67(b)(2): 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)(2)( 1976). The court also has discretionary power
to hear cases upon petition of the accused "on good cause shown" after review by a court of military
review. Id. art 67(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)(3) (1976). It should be noted that Article 67 of the Code
specifically relies on Article I of the Constitution for its authority to create the Court of Military
Appeals; therefore, direct review of court-martial convictions by the Supreme Court and other civil
courts is not available. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969). The fact that the system of military courts
is outside the judicial branch's powers established in Article III of the Constitution does not preclude
a collateral attack on a court-martial proceeding. For a thorough treatment of civilian review of
court-martial proceedings, see Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A
Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and Military Responsibilities, 54 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
The intermediate appellate court within the military system is provided for by U.C.M.J. art. 66.
This provision requires each judge advocate general to establish a court of military review consisting
of no less than three members and to refer to it for review cases in which the sentence affects a
general or flag officer or extends to death; dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman;
dishonorable discharge or bad-conduct discharge; or confinement for one year or more. U. C.M.J.
art. 66(b); 10 U.S.C. 1866(b) (1976). Unlike appellate courts in the civilian systems, the courts of
military review have the statutory power to review questions of both law and fact. Id. art. 66(c); 10
U.S.C. § 866(c) (1976).
Unlike the Court of Military Appeals, which was an original creation of the Uniform Code, the
courts of military review had a predecessor in the form of boards of review under the Articles of War.
See Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, art. 501/ 2, 41 Stat. 797-99. The members of the present courts of
military review are, like their predecessors on the boards of review, appointed by thejudge advocates
general of the respective branches of the armed services. A decision by a court of review in one
branch is not binding upon a court in another branch; a Court of Military Appeals decision does have
a stare decisis effect in all services. For a complete discussion of the court-martial review procedures
of the military justice system. see MOYER, supra note 3, §§ 2-751 to -867. See also Willis, The United
State.' Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55 MIL. L. REV. 39 (1972).
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terms of enlistment,"5 are subject to military law. Thus, it would
appear that an active duty service member charged with a service-
connected crime would be amenable to court-martial. Suppose, however,
that before the criminal activity of the soldier was discovered, he was
discharged and immediately reenlisted so that his rank, pay, and
privileges continued uninterrupted.6 Would he still be amenable to
court-martial for the offenses committed prior to discharge and reen-
listment? Under pre-Code military law, the answer depended upon
whether or not a hiatus occurred between the discharge and reenlist-
ment. The general rule was that a discharge at the expiration of an
obligated term of service, or any other discharge that unconditionally
separated the individual from the service, created a hiatus and juris-
diction lapsed. The reenlistment did not revive the jurisdiction lost by
virtue of the hiatus, regardless of the length of time between discharge
and reenlistment." This general rule was recognized and applied by the
Supreme Court in the 1949 case of United States ex rel. Hirshberg v.
Cooke 9 where the Court gave "great weight" to the long-standing
practices of the services in deciding the scope of jurisdiction under the
5. U.C.M.J. art. 21); 10 U.S.C. §8021) (1976).
6. A.R. 601-280 (Jul. 1. 1977) governs the reenlistment procedures, qualifications, and disqualifications
for the Department of the Army. Chapter 2 of that regulation is applicable to a member currently
serving on active duty who desires immediate reenlistment. Of special interest to the issues of this
article is the definition of the term "immediate reenlistment." That term means
aI voluntary enrollment in the Regular Army as an enlisted member immediately upon
separation from active military service in the Army. This term represents a concurrent action
in which the separation documents are not given to the individual until he has been reenlisted
in the Regular Army. This term identifies enlistment in the Regular Army for the first time
as well as reenlistment.
Id. para. A-8. The Military Pay and Entitlements Manual, Department of Defense, Table 1-2-1,
provides that active duty pay begins on the date of reenlistment. Following the procedures of A.R.
601-280 with respect to immediate reenlistments has the effect of continuing pay without interruption.
A.R. 635-200, para. 5-9 (Nov. 21, 1977) provides for discharge of enlisted members for thepurpose of
immediate reenlistment. Id. para. 2-11 states that a discharge prior to the expiration of a term of
service will be governed by A.R. 601-280.
7. See, e.g., WINTHROP. supra note 3, at 89.
8. See, e.g.. United States v. Finnimore, No. CM-171874 (A.B.R., Sept. 11, 1926); United States v.
Africa, 3 B.R. 329 (1932); United States v. Mackiewiez, 5 B.R. 9 (1933); United States v. Sierer, II
B.R. 325 (1943); United States v. Butcher, 10 B.R.-J.C. 223 (A.B.R. 1951).
9. 336 U.S. 210 (1949) 1 hereinafter referred to as Hirshberg v. Cooke 1. Chief Signalman Harold E.
Hirshberg, U.S. Navy, was captured by the Japanese in 1942 upon the surrender of U.S. forces in
Corregidor. He remained a prisoner of war until September 1945 when he was liberated and returned
to the United States where he was hospitalized until January 1946. On 26 March 1946. his term of
service expired and he was honorably discharged. The next day he reenlisted in the Navy for a term of
four years. Approximately one year later, Hirshberg was charged and court-martialed for mistreating
fellow prisoners under his control during their period of captivity. At trial he was found guilty of two
of nine specifications and sentenced to ten months' confinement, reduction to apprentice seaman,
and a dishonorable discharge from the Navy. A writ of habeas corpus was granted by the district court,
United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 73 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), but reversed by the
court of appeals, United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 168 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1948). The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals holding that the Articles for the Government of the
Navy, art. 8)2), did not provide forjurisdiction to continue past a discharge granted at the expiration
of a period of obligated service. In interpreting the scope of jurisdiction granted under the Articles
for the Government of the Navy, the Court gave "great weight" to the manner in which the Army and
Navy had previously exercised jurisdiction. The Court found that the Army had uniformly held that a
discharge at the expiration of an obligated term of service terminated jurisdiction for offenses
committed prior thereto, notwithstanding a subsequent reenlistment. The Navy had followed the
same rule until 1932 when the Secretary of the Navy promulgated a regulation which provided for the
jurisdiction sought to be exercised over Hirshberg. The Court, however, ruled that regulations
promulgated by the executive departments could not enlarge jurisdiction beyond the limits set by
Congress and, therefore, the court-martial was without jurisdiction. See notes 144-159, infra, and
accompanying text. See also Note, Courts-Martial-Jurisdiction Over Person Discharged and Re-
Enlisted for Offense Committed During Prior Enlistment, 48 MICH. L. REV. 234 l 1949): Zeigler, The
Tertninationrf Jurisdiction Over the Person and the Offense. 10 MIL. L. REV. 139. 156-67 (1960).
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Articles for the Government of the Navy. ° Like most general rules,
there were certain exceptions. If the particular discharge was given
prior to the expiration of a term of service to facilitate a reenlistment
or if it was conditioned upon immediate reenlistment, then no hiatus
occurred and jurisdiction continued uninterrupted." If, in the hypothetical
situation posed above, the discharge was prior to the expiration of the
soldier's obligated term of service, i.e., a "short" discharge, then pre-
Code law would permit court-martial for offenses committed prior to
the discharge. If, on the other hand, the discharge and reenlistment
came at the expiration of the soldier's term of service, a hiatus would
have occurred leaving the military without jurisdiction to try the
individual, notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent reenlistment
allowed rank, pay, and privileges to continue as if no break had
occurred.
Under the Code, however, the solution to this hypothetical question
required a different analysis. Article 3(a) of the Code provides:
Subject to section 843 of this title (article 43), no person charged with
having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this
chapter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confinement
for five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in
the Courts of the United States or of a State, a Territory, or the District
of Columbia, may be relieved from amenability to trial by court-
martial by reason of the termination of that status.
The application of the statutory language to the hypothetical situation
requires an inquiry into five factors: (1) was the individual subject to
the Code when he committed the offense; (2) has his status as a person
subject to the Code terminated between the date of the offense and the
date of trial; (3) is the accused currently in a status in which he is
subject to the Code; 3 (4) is the offense punishable by confinement of
five years; (5) is the offense one which cannot be tried in a court of the
United States or of a state, territory or the District of Columbia. An
affirmative answer to all five inquiries is required to find jurisdiction
under Article 3(a). In the hypothetical case, the soldier was on active
duty when he committed the offense and also when charges were
brought, thus satisfying the first and third requirements. But, has there
10. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 216 (1949).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 10 B.R. 213(1939); United States v. Aikens, 5 B.R.-J.C. 331
(A.B.R. 1949); United States v. Butcher. 10 B.R.-J.C. 223 (A.B.R. 1951); United States v. Solinsky, 2
C.M.A. 153.7 C.M.R. 29 (1953). Cf. United States v. Rosenberg, No. GCM 121586 (Sep. 21. 1918);
United States v. Lackey. No. GCM 119582 (Jan. 2,1918); United States v. Warz. No. GCM 145710
(Sept. 21, 1921); United States v. Turner, No. GCM 149318 (A.pr. 2. 1922); United States v. Joly, No.
GCM 149937 (June 15, 1922); Exparte Joly, 290 F. 858, (S.D.N.Y. 1922); United States v. Sebastian,
No. GCM 302457 (Aug. 1, 1935).
12. 10 U.S.C. §803(a) (1976).
13. This particular requirement is not apparent from the language in the statute; in fact, the
language used contemplates the exercise of jurisdiction regardless of the accused's status at time of
trial. In Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11( 1955), however, the Supreme Court declared Article 3(a)
unconstitutional insofar as it purported to provide forjurisdiction over civilians who had severed all
connections with the military. See notes 209-216, infra, and accompanying text. In United States v.
Gallagher, 7 C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957), the Court of Military Appeals found Article 3(a)
constitutional when applied to one in the service at the time of trial.
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been a termination of status as a person subject to the Code between
the dates of the offenses and the date the court-martial sought to
exercise jurisdiction? If there has been such a termination, it would be
necessary to consider the fourth and fifth factors in resolving the
question of jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, there has been no
termination of status, Article 3(a) would be inapplicable and jurisdic-
tion would be grounded on Article 2(1).1" The ultimate question becomes:
What terminates status within the meaning of Article 3(a)? This question
sparked a debate among the judges of the Court of Military Appeals
that lasted some fourteen years and produced considerable confusion
as to when jurisdiction existed for offenses committed in a prior en-
listment. No less than three distinct theories or interpretations of
Article 3(a) emerged during the course of the judicial debates over this
aspect of military law. The confusion was finally resolved in United
States v. Ginyard5 where a majority of the court was able to agree on a
single theory and provide the military bar with a workable rule to
govern the termination of status as a person subject to the Code.
The facts in Ginyard were simple. The accused was charged with six
specifications of submitting false claims for travel expenses in violation
of Article 132 of the Code.16 The offenses were committed between
October 1964 and January 1965 but went undetected until July 1965.
Between the dates of the offenses and the date of their discovery,
Ginyard applied for, and was granted, a discharge prior to the expiration
of his normal term of service for the purpose of immediate reenlist-
ment. 7 At trial and on appellate review, Ginyard argued that the inter-
vening discharge terminated the Army's jurisdiction over him for
offenses committed prior to the discharge and the subsequent reen-
listment did not revive jurisdiction. Recognizing the state of confusion
that existed in this area of the law, the Court of Military Appeals
reasoned that a "simple rule of easy interpretation" was needed to
avoid future misunderstanding." With this goal in mind, the court
announced the following rule:
Once an enlisted man has been discharged from the armed forces,
that discharge operates as a bar to subsequent trialfor offenses occurring
prior to discharge, except in those situations expressly saved by Article
3(a) of the Code ....
14. 10 U.S.C. § 802(l) (1976).
15. 16 C.M.A. 512, 37 C.M.R.,132 (1967).
16. U.C.M.J. art. 13211(A); 10 U.S.C. §932( 1 (A)) 1976) makes punishable the knowing presentment
of false or fraudulent claims against the Government. The maximum punishment at the time of the
offense was a dishonorable discharge and confinement at hard labor for five years. MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL. UNITED STATES para. 127c (1951). The punishment limitation contained in
Article 3(a) was satisfied. However, the Court found that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 made this sort of fraud
triable in a U.S. district court and thus the military's jurisdiction did not survive under Article 3(a).
17. According to a stipulation of fact enetered into the record of trial, Ginyard originally enlisted
in the Army on 24 July 1963 for a period of three years. Hisoriginal enlistment was due to expire on 23
July 1966. In March 1965. Ginyard submitted a request to reenlist prior to the expiration of his
normal term of service in order to have enough time to complete a normal overseas tour of three
years and thus enable his family to join him in Europe as authorized dependents. United States v.
inyard, 36 C.M,R. 683. 687 1A.B.R. 1966).
18. United States v. Ginyard, 16 C.M.A. 512, 514-15.37 C.M.R. 132. 134-35 (1967).
19. Id. at 516.37 C.M.R. at 136 (emphasis in original).
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Ginyard's conviction was, of course, reversed and the charges dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. 2 '
The net effect of the court's holding was to establish the rule that all
discharges terminated status within the meaning of Article 3(a), thereby
precluding the court-martial of a soldier for offenses committed in a
prior enlistment, unless the offenses were punishable by five years'
confinement and not triable in the civilian courts. At the outset, it must
be noted that the Ginvard rule creates a significant gap in military
jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction over offenses committed in a
prior enlistment allows all purely "military offenses" that fail to meet
the five-year punishment requirement of Article 3(a) to go unpunished2'
and forces the armed services to rely on the state and federal courts to
deal with a wide variety of other offenses. 2
20. Id.
21 . Included in this category of offenses would be those violations of the Code that are peculiarly
military in nature and have no civilian counterpart. Some offenses that may arise under factual
conditions to which Gin 'rard is applicable are proscribed by the following articles of the U.C.M.J.:
art. 84, unlawful enlistment: art. 83. fraudulent enlistment: art. 89. disrespect toward superior
commissioned officer: art. 91. disobedience of lawful order, disrespect toward warrant or noncom-
missioned officer: art. 92., violation of lawful general order or regulation, knowingly failing to obey
orders, dereliction of duty: art. 93, cruelty or maltreatment of a subordinate; art. 96, releasing
prisoner without authority: art. 97. unlawful detention: art. 98, noncompliance with procedural
rules: art. 107, false official statements: art. 134, conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline,
The foregoing list is not intended to be all-inclusive. It would be virtually impossible to hypothecate
the myriad of factual situations that could possibly call for the application of Giti'ard with respect to
each "military offense" in the Code. Of course, some offenses are more susceptible to going
undetected for a period of time than others, and the Gitrard-excused offenses must remain
undetected until the individual reenlists. It is assumed that an individual would not be permitted to
reenlist if probable cause existed to charge him with an offense. But see United States v. Gladue, 4
M.J. I (C. MA. 1977): note 219. iitb'u. However, a situation may arise where an individual seeking
reenlistment is suspected of an offense, but there are insufficient grounds, at the time, to deny the
reenlistment. The military offenses proscribed by the following articles of the Code are punishable
by five years' imprisonment and thus would survive a discharge and reenlistment: art. 99, misbehavior
before the enemy: art. 100, subordinate compelling surrender: art. 102, improper use ofcountersign:
art. 105, misconduct as a prisoner of war. Again. the list is not intended to be all-inclusive. See,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para. 127c (1969 rev. ed.) for the maximum punishments of all
offenses under the Code.
22. This category of offense includes those acts or omissions that are normally the subject of
criminalstatutes, e.g., assault (art. 128): murder(art. 118): rape(art. 120): robbery(art. 122): burglary
(art. 129): etc. The maximum punishments for offenses in this area generally exceed five years'
imprisonment but it is the amenability to civilian prosecution that works to divest the military of
jurisdiction. The particular offense may be one that is a violation of a federal statute as well as the
Code and thus triable in a district court. For example, assume Sergeant Smith, an active duty
member of the Army. stole an item of government property worth $300. Before his involvement was
discovered he reenlisted. Larceny of property of a value in excess of $100 is punishable under the
Code by five years' confinement: therefore one Article 31a) limitation is met. However, 18 U.S.C. §
64111976) provides for punishment for i1w]hoever... steals.., any... thing of value of the United
States .... -Thus, Sergeant Smith's offense is triable in a civilian court and the military's jurisdiction
does not survive the discharge and reenlistment. Instead of stealing government property, assume
Sergeant Smith stole various items of personal property from his fellow soldiers' living quarters in the
barracks. Since the property stolen was private rather than government property, 18 U.S.C. §641
would not apply. If the value of the property stolen exceeded $100, the five-year punishment
limitation of Article 3(a) would also be met and it would appear that the military's jurisdiction would
remain intact. The offense was committed on a military post under exclusive federal jurisdiction; no
federal criminal statute, except the Uniform Code, makes such conduct a criminal offense:and the
punishment provided for by the.Code meets the five-year limitation of Article 3(a). However. the
Assimilative Crimes Act. 18 U.S.C. § 13( 1976).would preclude the exercise of military jurisdiction in
this hypothetical case. That provision incorporates state criminal laws into areas of exclusive federal
jurisdiction and provides for the state law to be applied in a trial in the district courts. The law of the
state wherein the military post was located would be applied in the federal courts through the
Assimilative Crimes Act and the offense would thus be cognizable by a civilian court and the GinrVard
rule would destroy military jurisdiction. Of course, the actual decision to prosecute Sergeant Smith
would be made by a local United States attorney who might or might not feel that Sergeant Smith's
case deserved to be added to an already crowded federal docket.
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This article focuses on whether Congress intended Article 3(a) to be
applied so as to create this gap. In order to facilitate appreciation of
the decisional morass that spawned the Ginyard rule, a brief review of
the various jurisdictional theories that were employed by the judges of
the Court of Military Appeals during their fourteen-year debate over
the scope and meaning of Article 3(a) is appropriate. This article will
then examine the Ginyard holding in light of the available evidence as
to congressional intent. Finally, the author will draw some conclusions
as to the correctness of the court's interpretation of Article 3(a) and
offer recommendations to fill the jurisdictional gap created by Ginyard.
1. WHEN DOES STATUS TERMINATE? FOURTEEN YEARS
OF DEBATE AND DISAGREEMENT
The debate among the judges of the Court of Military Appeals over
the termination of status issue began in 1953 with the case of United
States v. Solinsky23 and culminated with the Ginyard rule in 1967. The
intervening years saw no less than three distinct legal theories applied
by the court to resolve the issue. The theories ranged from an adoption
of pre-Code law, to a modified Hirshberg rule, to an intention-of-the-
parties analysis, with each focusing on a different aspect of the issue.
With seldom a majority behind any single theory, the conflicting and
divergent case decisions produced considerable confusion within the
military bar over the proper test for termination of status. Since the
purpose of the Ginyard holding was to end the existing confusion and
avoid future misunderstanding in this area of the law, 24 a brief discussion
of these judicial theories is helpful in setting Ginyard in its proper per-
spective.
Judge George W. Latimer25 approached the question of termination
of status under Article 3(a) in the same fashion as had been done under
pre-Code law, i.e., if the discharge created a "hiatus," jurisdiction ter-
minated; if no "hiatus," was created then status as a person subject to
the Code did not terminate and jurisdiction existed by virtue of Article
2.26 The application of Judge Latimer's philosophy required a case-by-
case analysis of the facts surrounding the discharge and reenlistment
to determine if a hiatus had occurred. Consistent with pre-Code law,
23. 2 C.M.A. 153,7 C.M.R. 29 (1953).
24. It is apparent that the disagreement between counsel on this issue stems from an attempt
to determine the specific factual situations in each case and to relate them to particular
military regulations. It is equally obvious that if misunderstanding is to be avoided in the
future a simple rule of easy interpretation is necessary.
United States v. Ginyard, 16 C.M.A. 512. 535, 37 C.M.R. 132. 135 (19671.
25. Judge Latimer was one of the original judges of the Court of Military Appeals. serving on the
bench from 20 June 1951 until I May 1961.
26. See, e.g.. United Statesv. Solinsky, 2 C.M.A. 153. 7 C.M.R. 29 (1953); United States v. Martin.
10 C.M.A. 636. 28 C.M.R. 202 (1959).
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Judge Latimer believed that an unconditional discharge given at the
expiration of an obligated term of service did constitute a sufficient
break of hiatus to cause status as a person subject to the Code to
terminate." If a hiatus had occurred, Judge Latimer then found it
necessary to determine if the charged offenses met the requirements
of being not triable in the civilian courts and of being punishable by
confinement for five or more years, as provided by Article 3(a), before
jurisdiction could be exercised.28 If, however, the discharge was prior
to the expiration of an obligated term of service, or one conditioned on
immediate reenlistment, the limitations imposed by Article 3(a) were
irrelevant since status had not terminated and jurisdiction continued
uninterrupted." Judge Latimer's analysis centered on whether there
was an actual break or hiatus in the individual's status as a person
subject to the Code and not merely on the question of whether there
was a period of time between the discharge and reenlistment.
This aspect of Judge Latimer's analysis is readily apparent from his
opinion in United States v. Frayer.30 While serving with the Army in
West Germany, Sergeant Frayer's term of enlistment expired and he
was honorably discharged. The following day he reenlisted to fill his
own vacancy. During the few hours between his discharge and reenlist-
ment, Frayer continued to occupy government quarters and retained
his post exchange and other privileges. Subsequent to his reenlistment,
Frayer was charged with one specification of making a false official
statement, several specifications of adultery, and one specification of
communicating a threat. The false official statement and five of the
alleged acts of adultery were charged as having occurred prior to the
reenlistment.3
The majority found that the discharge at the expiration of the term
of service ended jurisdiction and that Article 3(a) did not save jurisdiction
because the offenses were not punishable by five years' imprisonment.32
Dissenting on the jurisdictional issue, Judge Latimer implicitly acknow-
ledged that, ordinarily, a discharge at expiration of a term of service
ends jurisdiction, regardless of the length of any hiatus. In fact, he
stated that, in his opinion, for a person to be subject to trial by court-
martial he must be "subject to military law both at the time the offense
is committed and at the time of trial, and ... at all times between the
27. United States v. Gallagher. 7 C.M.A. 506. 22 C.M.R. 29611957). C,: United States v. Wheeler,
10 C.M.A. 646, 28 C.M.R. 212 (1959).
28. United States v. Gallagher. 7 C.M.A. 506.22 C.M.R. 296 11957).
29. United States v. Martin, 10 C.M.A. 636. 28 C.M.R. 202 (1959). The accused had served
sufficient time on an indefinite enlistment to demand an unconditional discharge, but instead of
asking to be separated, he asked for a discharge and immediate reenlistment for a term of six years. In
a concurring opinion, Judge Latimer recognized Martin's right to be unconditionally discharged, but
felt that his failure to exercise that right in favor of the request for a "short discharge and immediate
reenlistment" pursuant to Army regulations prevented a hiatus from occurring and status continued
uninterrupted. Id. at 639. 28 C.M.R. at 205.
30. 11 C.M.A. 600, 29 C.M.A. 416 j 1960).
31. Id at 602. 29 C.M.R. at 418.
32. Id at 602-03. 29 C.M.R. at 418-19.
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two events."3 Judge Latimer concluded, however, that upon these
facts jurisdiction did not lapse due to the honorable discharge since
the accused merely went from one status as a person subject to the
Code (a member of the regular component, Article 2(1)) to another
status as a person subject to the Code (a person accompanying the
armed forces outside the United States, Article 2(11))3" and then back
to an Article 2(1) status upon reenlistment. Thus, Judge Latimer con-
cluded that the discharge was irrelevant since Frayer's status as a
person subject to the Code had not terminated and, therefore, Article
3(a) was inapplicable. The judge compared the facts of this case with
the following dictum in United States v. Solinsky: 31
"Under these circumstances he would either be accompanying or serving
with the Armies of the United States from the moment he left these
shores until he returned. If, for a moment, he stepped from his uniform
into civilian clothes and then back again, he never stepped into a
category which was not subject to military law. Under the principles
announced in all the authorities, and under the Articles of War, he
was always subject to courts-martial jurisdiction. A momentary break
in service does not necessarily break court-martial jurisdiction. It did
in the Hirshberg case but as we view the particular circumstances
of this case, we find it did not do so here." 36
33. Id. at 605, 29 C.M.R. at 421.
34. 10 U.S.C. § 80211) (1976). This particular provision has been held unconstitutional when
applied to dependents of members of the armed forces, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and to
civilian employees of the armed forces overseas, McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361
U.S. 281 (1960). The Supreme Court decisions concerning Article 2(11) had been rendered when
Frarer was decided, but Judge Latimer, without analysis, stated that those decisions were not
applicable. United States v. Frayer. 11 C.M.A. 600, 605-06, 29 C.M.R. 416, 421-22 (1960). Judge
Latimer may have felt that Frayer's status as a soldier on a short "hiatus" between discharge and
reenlistment was sufficient grounds to distinguish Reid and McElroy and that Article 2(11) in those
circumstances was constitutional.
35. 2 C.M.A. 153. 7 C.M.R. 29 (1953). Solinsky was decided under pre-Code law since the
discharge and reenlistment of the accused occurred prior to the effective date of the Code. Latimer's
opinion represents a classic statement of the pre-Code rule governing discharges prior to the
expiration of a term of service. Sergeant Solinsky was serving in Europe when he requested a
discharge prior to the expiration of his enlistment so that he might reenlist for an indefinite period.
The request was approved and the reenlistment accomplished on Septemberf6, 1949. Some time after
the oath of reenlistment was administered.Solinsky was given a discharge dated September 5, 1949.
Subsequent to the reenlistment, it was discovered that while assigned as a postal clerk during the
period April to June 1948, Solinsky stole and forged several postal money orders. Writing for the
majority in a two-to-one decision, Judge Latimer found that under pre-Code law such a discharge did
not interrupt the accused's status as a person subject to military law. He noted that the discharge was
conditioned upon the immediate reenlistment of the accused, the discharge certificate was not
delivered until after the reenlistment, and that "every fact and all circumstances point to a situation
where the discharge and reenlistment were to be simultaneous events for the sole purpose of
preventing a hiatus or break in the service." Id. at 159, 7 C.M.R. at 35. Judge Latimer noted that the
Supreme Court in Hirshberg had relied on the long-standing practices of the services in finding that
an unconditional discharge at the expiration of an obligated term of service did create a hiatus that
destroyed jurisdiction, and he, therefore, relied on the same long-standing practices in determining
the rule to apply in this case. See id. at 154-55, 7 C.M.R. at 30-31. Judge Latimerstated that if the court
were to make the "unreasonable assumption" that the discharge interrupted Solinsky's status,
jurisdiction would still be present since the discharge and reenlistment took place in Europe and
Article of War 2(d). Act of June 4, 1920. ch. 227, 41 Siat. 787, provided for jurisdiction over "all
persons accompanying or serving with the Armies of the United States without the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." Therefore, even during the"hiatus," Solinsky would have still been
in a status subject to military law. Id. at 160, 7 C.M.R. at 36. It was this portion of the opinion that
Latimer relied on in Frayer to sustain jurisdiction.
36. United States v. Frayer. II C.M.A. 600,606, 29 C.M.R. 416,422 (1960), quoting United States v.
Solinsky, 2 C.M.A. 153, 160, 7 C.M.R. 29, 36 (1953).
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If Sergeant Frayer had been stationed in the United States when
he was discharged, Article 2(11) would not have been applicable. The
break, short as it was, between discharge and reenlistment would have
created a hiatus in Frayer's status as a person subject to the Code and,
under Judge Latimer's theory, jurisdiction could not have been sustained.37
The second of the three theories espoused by the members of the
Court of Military Appeals during this period was that of Chief Judge
Robert E. Quinn 3s and centered on the intent of the parties regarding
the discharge and reenlistment. Chief Judge Quinn felt that if an
examination of the facts surrounding the discharge in question revealed
an intent to continue the individual's status uninterrupted, then juris-
diction did not lapse and Article 3(a) was not applicable.39 If this intent
was not present, the discharge ended jurisdiction and the limitations of
Article 3(a) must be met before prosecution would lie for an offense
committed during the prior enlistment. 40 The Chief Judge's reliance on
the intent of the parties as the crucial factor in determining when
status as a person subject to the Code terminated did not emerge at the
outset of the debates. In fact, his early opinions appear totally incon-
sistent with his later expressions. For example, in his dissenting opinion
in the pre-Code case of United States v. Solinsky,4 Chief Judge Quinn
concluded that Hirshberg stood for the proposition that "once an en-
listed man has been discharged from the armed forces, that discharge
operates as a bar to subsequent trial for offenses occurring prior to
discharge, except in those situations expressly saved by applicable
statute.'42 The Chief Judge noted that there was no statute that saved
37. Judge Latimer's test for termination of status is the same one used by the military before the
Code was enacted, and he never deviated from it nor inquired if Congress had intended to change the
standard. In his Solinskr opinion, Judge Latimer pointed out that:
Congress authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to govern the ad-
ministration of military law, and as early as 1928, he had prescribed that so long as a dis-
charge did.not terminate an accused's status as a person belonging to a general category of
persons subject to military law, courts-martial jurisdiction would not be lost. In spite of
the fact that this regulation has been in the Manual since 1928, and that the Army has inter-
preted the regulations to continue jurisdiction over the dischargee. Congress has not seen
fit to pass contrary regulations. Again, in this instance, we do not have conflicting Army
regulations as the administrative construction has always been that under this type of
discharge, jurisdiction does not terminate. Accordingly, ifCongress has, by not requiring a
change in the practice, approved the Army construction, the doctrine of the Hirshberg
case would require an affirmance of the Iconviction 1.
United States v. Solinsky, 2 C.M.A. 153, 160, 7 C.M.R. 29, 36 (1953).
Judge Latimer relied on this same concept in United States v. Martin, 10 C.M.A. 636, 28 C.M.R.
202 (1959), to justify his use of the pre-Code test. Evidently, in his opinion, the failure of Congress to
specifically legislate on this point was tantamount to congressional approval, What this theory
overlooks is that the statutes which, as interpreted, gave rise to the test were repealed and replaced
by the Code. This being the case, some inquiry should have been made to determine if the Code and
Congress adopted the old test, or if a new standard was envisioned. Judge Latimer, apparently, did
not share this view.
38. Appointed as the court's first Chief Judge, Quinn served on the court in that capacity from
June 20, 1951 to April 25, 1975.
39. See. e.g.. United States v. Noble. 13 C.M.A. 413, 32 C.M.R. 413 (1962): United States v.
Steidley, 14 C.M.A. 108. 113-14.33 C.M.R. 320, 325-2611963) (Quinn, C.J., dissenting): United States
v. Ginyard, 16 C.M.A. 512, 516-17, 37 C.M.R. 132, 136-37 (1967) (Quinn, C.J., dissentng).
40. Sec United States v. Robson, 16 C.M.A. 527,528-29,37 C.M.R. 147, 148-49 (1967) (Quinn, C.J.,
concurring).
41. 2 C.M.A. 153, 7 C.M.R. 29(1953).
42. Id. at 161, 7 C.M.R. at 37. See note 35 supra.
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the military's jurisdiction over Sergeant Solinsky. 43 In United States v.
Gallagher,' Chief Judge Quinn noted that Congress had passed Article
3(a) to cover a reenlistment situation and, since Gallagher's offenses
met the limitation of Article 3(a), jurisdiction was present. 45
The first crack in Chief Judge Quinn's theory appears in United
States v. Martin.46 Martin was charged with several specifications of
submitting false travel claims in violation of Article 132 of the Code.
The offenses were committed prior to a discharge from an indefinite
enlistment and an immediate reenlistment." Chief Judge Quinn noted
his dissent in Solinsky but found that Article 3(a) was intended by
Congress to "expand the 'statutory' jurisdiction of court-martial beyond
the confines of the Hirshberg opinion."4 Chief Judge Quinn pointed
out that the offenses were triable in a federal district court, but since
the accused was on active duty at the time of the commission of the
offenses and at the time of trial, the limitations of Article 3(a) were not
applicable.4" His view was that Article 3(a) was "intended to enlarge
jurisdiction, not to restrict it" and there was no need to examine the
discharge or the circumstances surrounding it in order to determine if
a gap or hiatus existed. 0 To emphasize his view that jurisdiction
depends solely on status at the time of the offense and at the time of
trial regardless of any break in service, he cited the following portion
of his opinion in Gallagher:
"One who reenlists in the service after a discharge is not 'like Toth.'
[a civilianI On the contrary, his position is like that of a person who
leaves the country after committing a crime. During the time he is
outside the jurisdiction he cannot be tried. But if he returns, he can,
subject to the statute of limitations, be tried and convicted for an
43. Id.
44. 7 C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
45. Id. at 513, 22 C.M.R. at 303. Sergeant Gallagher was a prisoner of war in Korea when his enlist-
ment expired. Upon his return to the United States after his release, he requested reenlistment. He
was discharged, reenlisted, and was subsequently charged with various offenses committed while he
was a prisoner. After being tried and convicted, the issue of jurisdiction was argued before the Army
Board of Review. The Board held that the discharge given Gallagher at the expiration of his term of ser-
vice ended jurisdiction despite the fact that abbreviated discharge procedures were used to facilitate the
reenlistment and that jurisdiction could not be asserted under Article 3(a) since the Supreme Court
in Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), had ruled that provision unconstitutional. See United States v.
Gallagher, 21 C.M.R. 435 (A.B.R. 1956). See also note 13, supra. The Court of Military Appeals
reversed, holding that Article 3(a) was constitutional when applied to one who was in the service at
the time of trial. United States v. Gallagher. 7 C.M.A. 506, 513, 22 C.M.R. 296,303 11957).
46. I0 C.M.A. 636,28 C.M.R. 202. (1959).
47. Id. at 638, 28 C.M.R. at 204.
48. Id. at 639, 28 C.M.R., at 205.
49. Id.
50. id. The only possible explanation as to how Chief Judge Quinn was able to disregard the Article3 1a) requirement that the offense be not triable in a civilian court is that, prior to the Code, frauds
against the Government were cognizable by a court-martial even after discharge (Article of War94,
Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 805-06), and since Article 3(a) was designed to "enlarge
jurisdiction, not to restrict it," the jurisdiction over frauds still existed. If, in fact. Chief Judge Quinn
followed this line of reasoning. he completely overlooked the fact that the jurisdiction 6ver frauds
was provided by statute and that statute, along with the rest of the Articles of War, was repealed and
replaced by the Code. Furthermore. the Code is devoid of any mention of a special category of
jurisdiction over frauds against the Government.
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offense committed by him before his departure."'"
Interestingly enough, Chief Judge Quinn made no references to the
intent of the parties or the purpose of the particular discharge. In fact,
he expressly stated that there was no need to even consider the fact
that there was an intervening discharge. 2 Military status at the time of
the offense and at the time of trial was sufficient under his interpretation
of Article 3(a).13
During the next term of court, United States v. Frayer4 was decided
and Chief Judge Quinn added a new twist to his theory. Frayer, as will
be remembered, was discharged at the expiration of his term of service
and reenlisted the following day. He was subsequently charged with
several specifications of adultery and making a false official statement,
all prior to his discharge."5 Chief Judge Quinn cited his Martin opinion
for the proposition that Article 3(a) was intended to enlarge jurisdiction
but added that this enlarged scope only went to "major offenses," i.e.,
those punishable by confinement of five years or more.16 He concluded
that, since the charged offenses were not so punishable, jurisdiction
was lacking. 7
When the Chief Judge's opinion in Frayer is compared with his
Martin opinion, a rather startling interpretation of Article 3(a) arises.
In Martin, the fact that the accused was on active duty both at the time
of the offense and at the time of trial was sufficient to maintain
jurisdiction, thereby disregarding the limitation that the offense be
one not triable in the civilian courts.5" In Frayer, however, Chief Judge
Quinn finds the five-year punishment limitation controlling, regardless
of the fact that the accused was on active duty both at the time of the
offense and at the time of trial.5 9 It should be noted that the limitations
on jurisdiction in Article 3(a) are in the conjunctive and the wording of
that statute does not seem to elevate one limitation above the other.
This approach enables the Chief Judge to ignore the express and
unambiguous limitation that the offense be one not triable by a civilian
court, but yet give effect to the punishment limitation, all in the name
51. United States v. Martin. 10 C.M.A. 636, 639.28 C.M.R. 202. 205 (19591, quoting United States
v. Gallagher. 7 C.M.A. 506. 513, 22 C.M.R. 296. ,303 11957).
52. "Whether the accused's discharge was, under the statutes and regulations, conditioned upon
immediate reenlistment, or whether there was a gap or hiatus in the accused's service need not give
us pause." Id. at 638. 28 C.M.R. at 204.
53. I. at 638. 639. 28 C.M.R. at 204. 205.
54. t I C.M.A. X). 29 C.M.R. 416. 119601.
55. I/. at 602.29 C.M.R. at 418.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 603. 29 C.M.R. at 419.
58. See notes 46-53. supra. and accompanying text.
59. United States v. Frayer. tt C.M.A. 600. 602-03. 29 C.M.R. 416, 418-19 (1960:
The offenses Congress had in mind were those which could be considered "major" offenses.
lCitation omitted.tits views were formalized in the Article 3(a) requirement that the prior
enlistment offense be one "punishable by confinement for five years or more."
296- The Air Force Law Revie w/1979
HeinOnline  -- 21 A.F. L. Rev. 296 1979
of congressional intent.6"
Of further significance to the development of Chief Judge Quinn's
theory is the fact that the Chief Judge noted that Frayer "reenlisted to
fill his ow'n vacancy" and that he retained his government quarters and
privileges during the interval between his discharge and reenlistment
because "it was his intention to reenlist."'" As will be developed
below,62 these and similar manifestations of the intent of the parties
were to become crucial in deciding later cases, but were merely
mentioned in the recitation of the facts in Frayer and were given no
particular importance. Not until 1962 and the case of United States v.
Noble63 did any hint of an "intent of the parties" or "purpose of the
discharge" analysis emerge from Chief Judge Quinn's analytical scheme.
In Noble, the accused was an Air Force master sergeant who was
charged with several specifications of larceny and misappropriation.
The offenses were allegedly committed prior to October 1960. It
appears that the accused's original term of service was due to expire on
December 13, 1960; however, he had requested and had been granted
two extensions of his six-year term which resulted in an obligation to
serve until October 1962. On December 8, 1960, Noble requested that
his previously approved extension be cancelled, his original discharge
date be restored, and that he be allowed to reenlist in order to obtain
benefits that were not available under an extension of enlistment. The
requests were granted and Noble executed the oath of reenlistment on
December 14, 1960. Orders were promulgated cancelling the two ex-
tensions "contingent upon" the December 14 reenlistment. A week
later a discharge certificate dated December 13, 1960, the above-
mentioned orders, and related papers were delivered to the accused.
In October 1961, Noble was tried and convicted by a court-martial.6 4
On appeal, the defense asserted that the alleged offenses were triable
in the federal courts as larceny and misappropriation of government
60. Compare United States v. Martin. 10 C.M.A. 636. 639, 28 C.M.R. 202. 205 1959) where Chief
Judge Quinn states:
It is contended, however, that since the offense in issue is triable in a Federal district court
as a violation of either 18 USC § 287 or § 1001. Article 3(a) prohibits the exercise of court-
martial jurisdiction. The argument distegards the fundamental purpose of the Article. The
Article was intended to enlarge jurisdiction, not to restrict it.
with the following language from his Frayer opinion:
Although it IUnited States v. Martini differed on its specific application in that case. a
majority of the Court agreed that Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10
USC § 803. was intended by Congress to confer upon the military the power to prosecute
an accused after re-enlistment for an offense committed before discharge, which the Supreme
Court of the United States had found to be lacking in Hirshberg v. Cooke .... What is im-
portant is that the offense be one which Congress intended to be prosecutable, notwith-
standing the intervening discharge.I Citations omitted. ]The offenses Congress had in mind
were those which could be considered "major" offenses.
United States v. Frayer. II CMA 600. 602, 29 C.M.R. 416. 418 11960).
61. 11 C.M.A. 600, 602, 29 C.M.R. 416. 418 11960).
62. See notes 70-80. infra, and accompanying text.
63. 13 C.M.A. 413.32 C.M.R. 413 (1962).
64. Id at 414-15.32 C.M.R. at 414-15.
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property"5 and, thus, did not meet the Article 3(a) limitations for
jurisdiction over offenses committed prior to a discharge.' The defense
further argued that the misappropriation offenses were not punishable
by imprisonment of five years or more and thus failed the Article 3(a)
requirement on both counts.
67
In view of Chief Judge Quinn's opinions in Martin and Frayer, one
would have expected him to sustain jurisdiction over the larceny
offenses for two reasons: first, the accused was on active duty at the
time of the offense and at the time of trial and, second, the alleged
crime met the punishment 'criteria of five years and thus could be
classified a "major" crime, similar to those charged in Martin.6" By the
same token, one would have expected the Chief Judge to deny jurisdiction
over the misappropriation offenses, for they, like the charges in Frayer,
did not satisfy the five-year punishment requirement of Article 3(a).69
Strangely enough, Chief Judge Quinn seemed to abandon his Martin-
Frayer analysis completely and pay primary attention to the purpose
and effect of the discharge.7" Upon examination of the facts surrounding
the discharge and reenlistment, Chief Judge Quinn found that the new
enlistment was merely a substitution of the previous extensions, since
those extensions were cancelled only after the accused had executed
the oath of reenlistment.7t Chief Judge Quinn concluded that under
those circumstances, "status" as a person subject to the Code never
terminated and Article 3(a) was not applicable.72
Chief Judge Quinn's dissenting opinion in United States v. Steidley73
further illustrates his change of heart. Steidley was charged with
multiple specifications of larceny, misappropriation, and forgery allegedly
committed prior to a discharge and immediate reenlistment. 74 The
Chief Judge disagreed with the majority's finding that the accused was
not subject to military jurisdiction because the offenses were triable in
the federal courts.75 He preferred returning the record to the Board of
65. 18 U.S.C. §641 (1976). See note 22. supra.
66. United States v. Noble. 13 C.M.A. 413. 415. 32 C.M.R. 413. 415 (1962).
67. Id.
68. See notes 46-53, supra, and accompanying text.
69. See notes 54-60, supra, and accompanying text.
70. Unites States v. Noble. 13 C.M.A. 413, 416, 32 C.M.R. 413, 416. (19621. Chief Judge Quinn
pointed out that "military status is terminated upon the occurrence of two conditions: (I) Execution
of a discharge certificate or promulgation of appropriate orders of separation: and (2) delivery of the
instrument providing for discharge. with the intention that it take effeci according to its terms. "Id. at
415-16. 32 C.M.R. at 415-16lemphasis added). He also noted that the orders providing for cancelation
of the existing extensions of Noble's original enlistment were contingent upon the reenlistment, and
were not delivered until after the reenlistment papers had been executed.
71. Id. at 416. 32 C.M.R. at 416.
72. "Manifestly. we are not dealing with an accomplished separation for the purpose of reenlist-
ment. but with the fact that there was no actual termination of accused's status as a person subject to
military law." Id
73. 14 C.M.A. 108. 33 C.M.R. 320, (1963).
74. Id. at 109-10. 33 C.M.R. at 321-22.
75. Steidley was charged with twenty-one specifications of larceny and wrongful appropriation of
government property in violation of U.C. M.J. art. 121 and eight specifications of forging government
documents in violation of U.C.M.J. art. 123. The court found that several of the larceny and wrongful
appropriation charges committed in the prior enlistment failed to satisfy the five-year punishment
requirement of Article 3(a) due to the value of the property involved. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL.
UNITED STATES para. 127c (1951). Additionally. the court found that. even though all offenses were
committed in Japan, they were triable in the federal courts due to the extraterritorial effect of 18
U.S.C.§§ 641. 494. United States v. Steidley, 14 C.M.A. 108.Il. I 112.33 C.M.R. 320. 323,324 11963).
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Review for a rehearing on the jurisdictional issue. Chief Judge Quinn
felt that the record was "too weak and too uncertain to support the
conclusion that the accused was given an unqualified discharge. '76 He
noted further that facts and circumstances in the record supported "an
inference that the accused asked for an early discharge and simultaneous
reenlistment to further his personal interests. '77 This approach by
Chief Judge Quinn is a radical departure from his earlier views and
Seems to be rather close to Judge Latimer's theory of a "real hiatus" or
"actual" break in service.7" The extent of Chief Judge Quinn's reliance
on the intent of the parties in establishing the purpose and effect of the
discharge is further illustrated by his dissent in Ginyard and in the
76. Id. at 113. 33 C.M.R. at 325 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. See notes 25-37. supra. and accompanying text. Chief Judge Quinn pointed out that Steidley
enlisted August 2, 1956, for a period of six years. which placed his expiration date as August 1. 1962,
but that he reenlisted some sixty days prior to the expiration date of his obligated term "in order to go
to a 'new duty station.- United States v. Steidley. 14 C.M.A. 108, 113.33 C.M.R. 320. 325 (1963). On
these facts. Judge Latimer would have clearly found jurisdiction. The Chief Judge's view that the
record should be remanded for "further inquiry- illustrates, however, that even though the discharge
was prior to the expiration of the term of enlistment, he does recognize the possibility that the
discharge may have been unqualified and thus Article 3(a) would apply. As his subsequent opinions
indicate, the "further inquiry" was to be directed toward the intent of the parties. See notes 79. 80,
infra.
79. The majority in Ginard cited Chief Judge Quinn's dissent in Solinsky (see notes 41-43. supra.
and accompanying text) for the proposition that Hirshberg mandated that a discharge ended
jurisdiction unless a statute provided otherwise. The Chief Judge stated that the majority's reliance
on his Solhisky dissent was misplaced since, in his view. Solinsky was given an unconditional
discharge and reenlisted the following day while the record in Gityard clearly showed that "the
parties intended that no actual separation from the service be effected.'" United States v. Ginyard, 16
C.M.A. 512, 516-17, 37 C.M.R. 132. 136-37(1967). Apparently, it was the i'pe of evidence presented
in the Ginyard and Solihsky cases that made the difference to Chief Judge Quinn. In Ginyard. Chief
Judge Quinn stated:
I agree with the majority's unarticulated premise that the fact the accused received a "short
term discharge." that is. a discharge prior to the regular date of expiration of the enlistment,
is not controlling. However. unlike them. I think the intention of the parties is extremely
important in determining the legal effect of what they did. As we observed in Noble. before
an instrument has legal consequence it must be delivered "with the intention that it take
effect according to its terms."
Id. at 516. 37 C.M.R. at 136. The Chief Judge then summarized the testimony of the accused and
determined that Ginyard knew and understood that his discharge was qualified upon his reenlistment.
Id. In Solitsky. however, the accused did itot testify. Applying the above quoted language to the
facts of Solinski one finds that the discharge was not delivered until after reenlistment had been
accomplished. United States v. Solinsky. 2 C.M.A. 153, 159, 7 C.M.R. 29, 35 (1953). Since it was not
delivered until after reenlistment, it was obviously not intended to terminate Sergeant Solinsky's
status. Furthermore, as stated by Judge Latimer,
there was no break in service or pay: the accused could have been ordered to perform a
special mission covering that period: he was entitled to every benefit incidental to membership
in the armed forces: there was not a fraction of a second that he was not subject to military
orders or military control: and every fact and all circumstances point to a situation where
the discharge and reenlistment were to be simultaneous events for the sole purpose of pre-
venting a hiatus or break in the service.
Id.
In finding that Ginyard did not have a separation from the service. Chief Judge Quinn, in effect.
places Ginyard in the same situation as Solinsky: the only difference being that in Gititard the
accused testified on the jurisdictional issue and in Solisky he did not. Chief Judge Quinn seems to be
saying that the intent of the parties will control, but that intent must be established by direct evidence
rather than circumstantial. Chief Judge Quinn's statement in Giiiyard that "Solinsky was actually
given an unconditional discharge on one day. and reenlisted on the next," United States v. Ginyard.
16 C.M.A. 512. 516.37 C.M.R. 132. 136 (1967). is hardly supported by the evidence and may merely
have been an attempt to rationalize two hopelessly inconsistent views.
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post-Ginyard case of United States v. Robson.5 5
Judge Homer Ferguson t was the proponent of yet another theory
on the meaning of Article 3(a). Judge Ferguson felt that Hirshberg v.
Cooke mandated that all discharges end jurisdiction and that reenlistment
does not revive jurisdiction over offenses committed in a prior enlist-
ment unless expressly saved by statute. 2 Judge Ferguson believed that
Congress adopted this interpretation of Hirshberg in Article 3(a), with
the exception of offenses not triable in civilian courts and those
punishable by confinement of five years or more. "3 In this regard,
Judge Ferguson found it unnecessary to inquire into the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding a particular discharge in order to resolve the
jurisdictional question. This view eventually carried a majority of the
court and became the Ginyard rule. 4
At first blush the theory seems rather straightforward, but Judge
Ferguson did waver at times, thereby contributing to the genral confusion
surrounding the issue. 5 His first opinion concerning the scope and
meaning of Article 3(a) in a factual situation where the jurisdictional
80. 16 C.M.A. 527. 37 C.M.R. 147 11967). in Robson the accused received a discharge prior to the
expiration of his term of service and immediately reenlisted. He was subsequently convicted of
larceny and forgery of postal money orders. The court applied the Giltyard rule and dismissed the
charges for lack of jurisdiction since the offenses were triable in the federal district court. Chief
Judge Quinn concurred and noted that the mere fact that the discharge was prior to the expiration of
a term of service and authorized under a regulation that provided that the discharge would not be
delivered until after reenlistment (A.R. 635-205. para. 3b (Jan. II, 1960)4 did not sufficiently establish
an intention that status was to continue uninterrupted. The Chief Judge pointed out that the date of
discharge reflected on the reenlistment documents was the day before the date of reenlistment and
that the regulation provided for the individual to be reenlistsed on the day following discharge. Id. at
528. 37 C.M.R. at 148. In concluding that the discharge was unconditional rather than contingent
upon immediate reenlistment, the Chief Judge said.
It may be that the parties here. as the parties in Ginyard. did not intend an actual termination
of accused's service, but rather a substitution of one period for another. No evidence of that
intention appears in the record.
Id.
There is no indication from the official report of the case that the accused testified on the
jurisdictional issue. Therefore, the Chief Judge seems to be erecting a rather formidable barrier for
the Government to cross in order to sustain jurisdiction under his theory. In Noble. Chief Judge
Quinn stated that for a discharge to terminate status it must be delivered "with the intention that it
take effect according to its terms." United States v. Noble, 13 C.M.A. 913, 416, 32 C.M.R. 413, 416
419621. That language indicates two elements are required for a discharge to terminate status: (I)
delivery and (2) intent to terminate status. In Robson. the Chief Judge's test finds that there was no
intent to continue status unbroken, but, he fails to reveal how the discharge delivered after a
reenlistment retroactively creates an interruption in status. This same flaw in theory is incorporated
in the Ginyard rule, making status as a person subject to the Code a conceptual or theoretical
category, rather than a practical classification. In drafting Article 3(a), however. Congress dealt in
very practical terms and did not put the theoretical gloss on status that the court has done. See notes
159-175. infr-a, and accompanying text.
8 . Judge Homer Ferguson was appointed to the bench on January 17, 1956. to fill the vacancy
created by the death of Judge Paul Brosman. Judge Ferguson accepted an appointment as Senior
Judg e May 2, 1971: his former position was filled by Judge Robert M. Duncan.
82. See. e.g., United States v. Frayer, II C.M.A. 600, 608-10, 29 C.M.R. 416. 424-26 11960)(Ferguson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part): United States v. Noble. 13 C.M.A. 413, 416-
19, 32 C.M.R. 413. 416-19 419621 (Ferguson. J., dissenting): United States v. Ginyard, 16 C.M.A.
512,37 C.M.R. 132 419671.
83. United States v. Noble, 13 C.M.A. 413. 416, 32 C.M.R. 413. 416 11962).
84. Compare United States v. Noble, 13 C.M.A. 413, 416-19, 32 C.M.R. 413. 416-19 11962)
(Ferguson. J., dissenting) with United States v. Ginyard, 16 C.M.A. 512, 37 C.M.R. 132 (1967).
85. See notes 94-99, infra, and accompanying text.
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limitations were not met appears in United States v. Martin." Both Chief
Judge Quinn and Judge Latimer sustained jurisdiction on their respective
theories and Judge Ferguson dissented. Noting that Martin's crimes
were cognizable by the federal courts, Judge Ferguson argued that the
requirements for jurisdiction had not been metY He relied on Hirshberg
for the rule as to when jurisdiction terminated and on Article 3(a) for
the exceptions. 8 In Judge Latimer's view, Martin's discharge was con-
ditioned upon his immediate reenlistment, thus continuing his status
without a break or hiatus. 89 Judge Ferguson disagreed with this char-
acterization of the discharge and was of the opinion that the discharge
was unconditional. After reviewing the facts, Judge Ferguson found
that "the accused's discharge from the service was in nowise conditioned
upon the execution of his reenlistment papers and that he, at the
moment of his release, stood in the position as one who had completed
his obligation to serve for a term certain."' 0 This conclusion regarding
the character of the discharge led Judge Ferguson to find that Hirshberg
controlled as to the termination of jurisdiction.9' In discussing the
similarity between Hirshberg and Martin, Judge Ferguson stated:
Thus, it was held that a service member's [Hirshberg's] discharge at
the end of his period of obligated service ended jurisdiction to try
him during a subsequent enlistment for any offense committed during
the prior enlistment. As this accused IMartinI occupies precisely the
same position as Hirshberg, I believe the cited Supreme Court decision
is dispositive here.92
Judge Ferguson's extensive discussion of the facts and his conclusion
as to the unconditional nature of the discharge and its similarity to the
discharge given to Hirshberg at the "end of his period of obligated
service" leads one to the conclusion that the Judge recognized the
legal principle relied on by Judge Latimer, that is, a "short" or conditional
discharge does not interrupt status and does not terminate jurisdiction,
but that he merely disagreed with Latimer's factual findings. Alter-
natively, one may also conclude that Judge Ferguson was not accepting
Judge Latimer's legal theory but merely attempting to point out to
Judge Latimer the error in his factual assessment. In any case, the fact
that two such conclusions can be drawn from Judge Ferguson's opinion
illustrates its contribution to the confusion over the Article 3(a) question.
86. 10 C.M.A. 636,642-46,28 C.M.R. 202, 208-12 (1959) (Ferguson. J., dissenting). Judge Ferguson's
first opinion concerning Article 3(a) appeared in United States v. Gallagher, 7 C.M.A. 506, 513-14.22
C.M. R. 296, 303-04 (1957) (Ferguson. J., concurring) where he tound that Article 31a) was constitutional
when applied to one in the service at the time of trial. See note 13. supra.
87. United States v. Martin, 10 C.M.A. 636. 645, 28 C.M.R. 202, 211 (1959).
88. Id. at 644-45, 28 C.M.R. at 210-11.
89. Id. at 641, 28 C.M.R. at 207. See note 29. supra.
90. Id at 643, 28 C.M.R. at 209.
91. Id. at 644, 28 C.M.R. at 210.
92. Id (emphasis added).
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Any confusion caused by Judge Ferguson in Martin was clarified by
his dissent in Noble, where he set forth what ultimately became the
Ginyard rule. Judge Ferguson noted that, in his view, Article 3(a) was a
"limited version of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in
Hirshberg v. Cooke and, as a result, "when a member of the service
ends one period of obligation and begins to serve under another-
regardless of how the change is effectuated-the provisions of Code,
supra, Article 3, come into play and govern the exercise of jurisdiction
over offenses committed during the prior period.
9 3
When Judge Paul J. Kilday94 replaced Judge Latimer on the Court of
Military Appeals in 1961, an opportunity became available to resolve
some of the confusion regarding the interpretation of Article 3(a).
Judge Kilday represented the swing vote between Judge Ferguson's
"Hirshberg rule" and Chief Judge Quinn's Martin-Frayer approach.95
The Noble case provided the military bar with its first look at Judge
Kilday's philosophy. As noted earlier, jurisdiction was sustained in
Noble with Judge Quinn seemingly abandoning his Martin-Frayer,
approach in favor of a "purpose and effect of the discharge" analysis.
Judge Ferguson, in dissent, applied his "Hirshberg rule." Judge Kilday,
without opinion, concurred with Judge Quinn.96 This alignment of a
majority of the court behind a single theory would seem to inject an air
of certainty and predictability into this area of military law. Any relief
associated with the establishment of a "majority rule" must have been
shaken somewhat when, in the very next term of court, the decision in
United States v. Steidley97 was handed down. Chief Judge Quinn and
Judge Ferguson held to their respective theories as espoused in Noble,9
but Judge Kilday, again without opinion, concurred with Judge Ferguson.9'
II. WHEN DOES STATUS TERMINATE? A RULE AT LAST
It was against this background of ever-changing and conflicting
judicial opinions that United States v. Ginyardtm came to be decided.
After an unsuccessful challenge to jurisdiction at trial, the issue was
argued before the Army Board of Review. The Board found that
Ginyard
received a "short" or "qualified" discharge conditioned upon his
immediate reenlistment, and the discharge and reenlistment were
effectuated at his request and for his benefit, to complete a normal
93. United States v. Noble, 13 C.M.A. 413. 416.32 C.M.R. 413.4164 1962).
94. Judge Kilday replaced Judge Latimer on September 25. 1961.
95. See notes 46-63. supra, and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Noble, 13 C.M.A. 413. 416.32 C.M.R. 413.416 11962).
97. 14 C.M.A. 108.33 C.M.R. 320 (1963).
98. See notes 63-72. 94-96. supra, and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Steidley. 14 C.M.A. 108. 113. 33C.M.R. 320. 325 119631.
100. 16 C.M.A. 512.37 C.M.R. 132 (1967). See notes 15-22. supra, and accompanying text.
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overseas tour. He never lost his status as a person subject to military
law and there was "merely a substitution of a new term of enlistment"
for the old.''
Accordingly, the Board determined that Ginyard's discharge was
similar to Noble's and applied the rationale of Noble to uphold juris-
diction.1'
Before the Court of Military Appeals, the defense argued that
Steidley marked a change in the law. Citing Chief Judge Quinn's
dissent in Steidley, appellate defense counsel contended that Steidley
was given a "short" or "qualified" discharge prior to the expiration of
his term of service, but the majority in Steidley considered that fact
immaterial and reached a holding that, in effect, overruled Noble. The
defense noted that Judge Kilday had concurred with Judge Quinn in
Noble, but had concurred with Judge Ferguson in Steidley and, as a
result of Judge Kilday's change of heart, the rule set out by Judge
Ferguson in his Noble dissent became the applicable law. °3 This rule,
the defense contended, produced a better result since
it [was] consistent with United States v. Hirshberg, supra, and Article
3(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, without the necessity of importing
exceptions to the apparent clear meaning of these authoritative sources
based on particular and rather unimportant circumstances occurring
at the time a soldier decides to reenlist, land secondlyl, it is a clear
rule that can be readily applied without the necessity for delving into
confusing and often dimly recalled factual matters which, because they
are not at all important at the time they occur, make the result in
individual cases more or less fortuitous. Also, such a rule ... avoidIsI
unfair difference between the soldier who reenlists at the end of his
previous enlistment (United States v. Frayer, supra) and the soldier
who, perhaps at the urging of the Government, and certainly to its
advantages, reenlists for an increased obligated term of service a few
days or months prior to the expiration of his current enlistment.' °4
The Government contended that Noble and Steidley were not
inconsistent since Noble involved a conditional or qualified discharge
and Steidley, as conceded by the Government, involved an uncondi-
tional discharge given at the expiration of Steidley's enlistment. 05 The
Government also assailed the defense's contention that Hirshberg
stood for the proposition that jurisdiction terminates upon discharge
regardless of the surrounding circumstances. °6
The court accepted the defense argument and set forth the rule that
101. United States v. Ginyard. 36 C.M.R. 683, 687 (A.B.R. 1966).
102. See id.
103. Brief for Appellant at 6, United States v. Ginyard. 16 C.M.A. 512, 37 C.M.R. 132 11967).
104. Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
105. Brief forAppelleeat 6-8. United States v. Ginyard. 16 C.M.A. 512. 37 C.M.R. 132 (1967).
106. Id. at 4.
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a discharge operates as a bar to subsequent trial for offenses occurring
prior to discharge unless the offenses meet the Article 3(a) requirements
of being punishable by confinement for five years or more and not
triable in the federal or state courts. °' 7 The Chief Judge dissented and
argued that while he agreed with "the majority's unarticulated premise
that the fact the accused received a 'short term discharge,' that is, a
discharge prior to the regular date of expiration of the enlistment, it is
not controlling." He felt that the intent of the parties was important in
determining the legal effect of a discharge and, therefore, it was neces-
sary to examine the surrounding circumstances."
The court's opinion in Ginyard put an end to the fourteen years of
confusion surrounding the termination of status question. Unfortunately,
the court's opinion did not deal with the cause of the confusion. In the
opinion, Judge Kilday states:
It is apparent that the disagreement between counsel.on this issue stems
from an attempt to determine the specific factual situations in each
case and to relate them to particular military regulations. It is equally
obvious that if misunderstanding is to be avoided in the future a simple
rule of easy interpretation is necessary."°
This view does not touch the real issue. When a case reaches the Court
of Military Appeals, the factual disputes should have all been resolved by
the Court of Review. If factual matters have not been adequately resolved
by the lower court, the case can be remanded for further factual deter-
minations." ° Alternatively, the court may rule that the Government has
the burden of proving jurisdiction and that those facts needed to establish
jurisdiction must appear in the record; therefore, a record that reflects
incomplete or conflicting jurisdictional facts must be decided in favor of
the accused."' In Ginyard, however, there was no disagreement over the
specific factual situations. The facts were uncontroverted. The accused
testified that he wanted to be transferred to Europe with his dependents,
but the time remaining on his current enlistment was insufficient and,
therefore, he signed an intent to reenlist. He also acknowledged that he
knew the discharge was conditioned upon his reenlistment for a longer
term. The indisputable conclusion is that Ginyard was given a discharge
prior to the expiration of his term of service for the express purpose of
immediate reenlistment."' To be sure, there was misunderstanding and
confusion, but not over factual matters. The misunderstanding and confusion
resulted from some fourteen years of debate among the court members
107. United States v. Ginyard. 16 C.M.A. 512, 516, 36 C.M.R. 132, 136 (1967).
108. Id. (Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 515, 36 C.M.R. at 135.
110. Cf United States v. Steidley. 14 C.M.A. 108. III. 33 C.M.R. 320. 323 (1963).
Ill. (f. United States v. Solinsky, 2 C.M.A. 153, 154,7 C.M.R. 29,30(1953); U.C.M.J. art. 67(e): 10
U.S.C. § 867(e) 1976).
112. United Statesv. Ginyard. 16C.M.A. 512, 516,37 C.M.R. 132. 136(19671 Quinn. C.J. dissent-ing)
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over the applicable law. It is beyond question that something needed to be
done to end the confusion. What the court should have done was to make
a step-by-step analysis of the issue and then arrive at a conclusion based
upon sound legal reasoning. What it did was to adopt a rule based on
judicial expediency motivated by self-induced frustration.
The resulting rule assumes the threshold question. The issue is not one
of continuing jurisdiction, but rather one of whether status as a person
subject to the Code terminates within the meaning of Article 3(a). If so, the
limitations on jurisdiction as imposed by the article govern; if not, those
limitations are irrelevant since jurisdiction is then based on Article 2 of the
Code."'3
During the fourteen years of debate within the court, legislative intent
was often cited and relied upon to support one view or another, depend-
ing upon what position a particular judge held. " 4 However, a thorough
and detailed inquiry into the legislative intent as to when status terminated
was never made. Judge Ferguson particularly relied on congressional in-
tent with regard to the types of offenses that could be tried under Article
3(a), while relying on Hirshberg for the rule as to terminations of status."5
This approach disregards the fact that Hirshberg was a statutory construc-
tion case and the statutes interpreted by the Supreme Court in that case
were repealed and replaced by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. "6
To be sure, the basic principles relied on by the Court in interpreting the
Articles for the Government of the Navy" 7 and the Articles of War"'
can, and should, be applied to the Code."9 To assume, however, that
these different statutes require the same result is to disregard the fact
that Congress used the concept of "termination of the status" in Article
3(a) and, therefore, congressional intent should provide the meaning.
As will be shown, 20 the court's assumption that Hirshberg governs all
discharges and that Congress adopted that misinterpretation in Article
3(a) cannot withstand analysis.
113. 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1976). Subsection (1) of Article 2 provides that "Imlembers of a regular
component of the armed forces, including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of
enlistment" are subject to the Code. Article 17 provides that "lelach armed force has court-martial
jurisdiction over all persons subject to this chapter." U.C.M.J. art. 17(a); 10 U.S.C. §.817(a) (1976).
See also id. arts 18, 19, 20: 10 U.S.C. §§818, 819. 820 (1976).
114. See, e.g.. United States v. Martin, 10 C.M.A. 636. 28 C.M.R. 202 (1959); United States v.
Noble, 13 C.M.A. 413.32 C.M.R. 413,1962).
115. See United States v. Noble. 13 C.M.A. 413.417-18.32 C.M.R. 413,417-18 (1962) (Ferguson, J..
dissenting).
116. See note 4. supra; notes 159-198. inro, and accompanying text.
117. Act of June 22, 1874. tit. xv, ch. 10. § 1624, 18 Stat. 274.
118. Act of June 4. 1920. ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759. 787-812.
119. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949). Cf United States v. Solinsky. 2 C.M.A. 153, 7
C.M.R. 29(1953).
120. See notes 159-198. infra, and accompanying text.
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III. WHEN DOES STATUS TERMINATE? THE INTENDED RULE
As noted in the introduction to this article, the Supreme Court, in
Hirshberg, gave "great weight" to the long-standing practices of the services
in determining the scope of their jurisdiction under the Articles of War.'2'
Of particular significance in this regard is the Court's reliance on Colonel
William Winthrop's classic treatise, Military Law and Precedents'22 for the
view that discharge terminates amenability to court-martial and subsequent
reenlistment does not revive the lapsed jurisdiction."23 The provision cited
by the Court is as follows:
JURISDICTION AFTER A SECOND APPOINTMENT OR
ENLISTMENT. It remains to refer to the effect, perse, of a subsequent
appointment or enlistment of an officer or soldier, (once duly dismissed,
resigned, &c., or discharged) upon his amenability to trial for an offense
committed prior to such discharge, &c., (and within two years,) but
not yet made the subject of a charge or trial. Upon this point there is
not known to have been any adjudication. Putting out of the question
the class of offenses, the amenability for which is expressly defined
by the 60th article, it is the opinion of the author that, in separating
in any legal form from the service an officer or soldier or consenting
to his separation therefrom, and remanding him to the civil status at
which the military jurisdiction properly terminates, the United States,
(while it may of course continue to hold him liable for a pecuniary
deficit,) must be deemed in law to waive the right to prosecute him
before a court-martial for an offense previously committed but not
brought to trial. In this view, a subsequent re-appointment or re-
enlistment into the army would not revive the jurisdiction for past
offenses, but the same would properly be considered as finally lapsed.'24
It is significant to note that Colonel Winthrop is referring to a
situation where the individual has been separated and "remandled]
. . . to the civil status at which the military jurisdiction properly
terminates."'25 A reasonable interpretation of the language of this
provision is that jurisdiction does not terminate unless the individual's
discharge or separation does, in fact, remand the individual to a "civil
status." This reading is supported by another provision in the same
work:
The general rule is that military persons-officers and enlisted men-
are subject to the military jurisdiction, so long only as they remain
such; that when, in any of the recognized legal modes of separation
121. See note 9, supra: notes 144-158, int/ra. and accompanying text.
122. WINTHROP. supra note 3.
123. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210. 216-17 (1949).
124. WINTHROP. ,upra note 3. at 93.
125. Id.
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from the service, they cease to be military and become civilpersons,
such jurisdiction can, constitutionally, no more be exercised over them
than it could before they originally entered the Army, or than it can
over any other members of the civil community.26
Colonel Winthrop clearly states that jurisdiction ceases when "military
persons" are separated in such a manner that they become "civil
persons." Whether this language was directed toward a Ginyard type
discharge or whether Colonel Winthrop was merely stating his opinion
as to the constitutionality of the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction
over civilians is unclear. Colonel Winthrop did note that, at the time of
his writing, there had been no known adjudication of the issue.,27 An
examination of the various volumes of the Digest of Opinion of The
Judge Advocate General of the Army from 1862 through 1901 fails to
reveal any decision on point. This being the case, one could argue that
Colonel Winthrop's view should be taken only to be a statement of the
general rule that jurisdiction ceases when the individual leaves the
service and should not be read as applicable to a discharge/immediate
reenlistment situation. Assuming, arguendo, that Colonel Winthrop is
not commenting on a Ginyard type discharge one way or the other, it
remains to be considered what developments took place in military
law subsequent to his work yet prior to the Hirshberg decision in 1949.
The earliest case having facts somewhat analogous to Ginyard is
United States v. Brigham,128 in which the accused was charged with
signing a false official statement in connection with his application for
commission. At the time of the offense, Brigham was an enlisted man.
Sometime after he was discharged to accept his commission, the false
statement was discovered and he was court-martialed.' In an en-
dorsement dated June 12, 1917, from the Judge Advocate General to
the Adjutant General concerning Lieutenant Brigham's case, the Judge
Advocate General opined that Brigham's discharge was merely for the
purpose of accepting a commission and was not like a discharge given
at the expiration of a term of service.'t Because of this difference, the
Judge Advocate General concluded that the discharge to accept a
commission did not have the effect of terminating one's military status
and the exercise of jurisdiction was therefore proper.'
The Brigham case was relied upon in United States v. Rosenberg3 2
126. Id. at 89.
127. Winthrop's treatise was first published in 1886.
128. No. CM 104677(1917).
129. Letter from the Judge Advocate General to the Adjutant General of the Army, subject: Trial
of Second Lieutenant Arthur Brigham. Jr. (Aug. 30. 1917) (Record Group No. 15.. The National
Archives).
130. Letter from the Judge Advocate General to the Adjutant General of the Army. subject: Trial
of Second Lieutenant Arthur Brigham. Jr. (June 12. 1917) (Record Group No. 153. The National
Archives), quoted it United States v. Rosenberg. No. CM 121586 at 3-4 119181.
131. Id.
132. No. CM 121586 (1918).
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to sustain jurisdiction over an officer for offenses committed while he
was an enlisted man, notwithstanding the fact that he was discharged
in order to accept a commission.'3 Similarly, jurisdiction was sustained
in United States v. Warz3 4 in which the accused was an emergency
officer and was discharged in order to be commissioned as a regular
officer. The Board of Review found that the discharge did not release
the accused from military service.'35 The Board of Review stated:
It follows that the recognized rule that discharge releases a person
in the military service from amenability for offenses committed prior
to such discharge, other than offenses under the 94th Article of War
[frauds against the Government ], which rule is based upon the complete
change of status and termination of service caused by an ordinary
discharge, is not applicable in this case.'36
In 1921, Major Charles Joly was convicted of making false official
statements and of embezzling government funds.' The accused chal-
lenged the court-martial's jurisdiction on the ground that the alleged
offense occurred while he was an emergency officer and that he had
since been discharged and recommissioned in the Regular Army. In
sustaining the conviction, the Board of Review noted that the embezzle-
merint was charged as a violation of the 94th Article of War, which
expressly provided for jurisdiction regardless of a discharge or other
termination of status.3 With reference to the false official statements,
the Board observed that it had "been repeatedly held, in parallel cases
where there was no interval of time during which the accused was
separated from the Army, that such a discharge does not relieve from
liability to trial by court-martial for offenses committed prior to the
discharge."
39
This theory of uninterrupted status as an exception to the general
133. Id. at 3-4.
134. No. CM 1457101 1921).
135. Id. at 5.
136. Id.
137. United States v. Joly, No. CM 149937 11922),
138. Id. at 8.
139. Id. Major Joly later sought relief from the federal courts by way of a writ of habeas corpus. Ex
parte Joly. 290 F. 858 tS. D.N.Y. 1922). alleging that the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over him
for offenses committed prior to discharge was unconstitutional. The court pointed out that the
statutory provision allowing court-martial jurisdiction even after a complete separation, Article of
War94, had been on the books since 1863, and1 in l the face, therefore, of more than halfa century of
practical construction and of the reported cases, this court will not hold the act unconstitutional." Id.
at 860. The charges of making false official statements were violations of Article of War 95 which did
not expressly state that jurisdiction continued after separation, but, like the Army Board of Review.
Circuit Judge Mayer had no difficulty sustaining the military's jurisdiction, even though he cited no
authority for his conclusion. In fact. he thought the presence of jurisdiction was "'so obvious that
extended discussion oflt hatI poin Iwasi unnecessary." Id. at 861. This rationale was criticized by the
district court in United States ex rel Hirshberg v. Malanaphy. 73 F. Supp. 990. 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1947),
but when the Supreme Court ruled in Hirshberg. they did not mention the Jolv case because the
Supreme Court considered Joly's discharge as conditional and not an interruption of his status.
whereas Hirshberg's discharge was unconditional and completely separated him from the Navy.
Thus there was no need to discuss Jolv or similar cases where the discharges were less than uncon-
ditional. See notes 144-158. infra, and accompanying text.
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rule that court-martial jurisdiction terminates upon discharge was
recognized by the 1928 Manual for Courts-Martial. Paragraph 10 of
that work provides:
In certain cases, where the person's discharge or other separation does
not interrupt his status as a person belonging to the general category
of persons subject to military law, court-martial jurisdiction does not
terminate. Thus, where an officer holding an emergency commission
was discharged from said commission by reason of acceptance of a
commission in the Regular Army, there being no interval between
services under the respective commissions, it was held that there was
no termination of the officer's military status, but merely the accom-
plishment of a change in his status from that of a temporary to that of
a permanent officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for
an offense (striking enlisted men) committed prior to the discharge
was not terminated by the discharge." °
In United States v. Johnson,1 41 the accused received a discharge
prior to the expiration of his term of service so that he might immediately
reenlist for three years. Subsequent to the reenlistment he was charged
with larceny, in violation of Article of War 93. The offense allegedly
occurred prior to the discharge and reenlistment, and at trial the
defense challenged the military's jurisdiction. The Board of Review
recognized the general rule that discharge terminated jurisdiction, but
also recognized the (by then) well-established corollary that where the
discharge does not terminate the military status of the accused, jurisdiction
does not lapse.t42
During the same period of time, the Boards of Review were also
reaffirming the general rule itself, that is, an unconditional discharge
given upon the expiration of a term of service ends the accused's
amenability to court-martial for offenses committed prior to such
discharge, a subsequent reenlistment notwithstanding. 43
Thus, it appears that at the time of the Hirshberg decision the rule in
the Army was that discharge terminated jurisdiction unless the discharge
did not interrupt the individual's status as a soldier.' 4 The Court of
140. A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES para. 10 (1928). The 1949 edition
of the manual contains the same provision. In 1951. the same provision was again included in the
manual, except the following sentence was added:
Similarly. when an enlisted person is discharged for the convenience of the Government
in order to re-enlist before the expiration of his prior period of service, military jurisdiction
continues provided there is no hiatus between the two enlistments.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES para. 116(1951). The above sentence was removed
from dhe manual after Giniard was decided. See Analysis of Contents, Manual for Courts-Martial.
United Slalet 1969 Rev. edI. D.A.P. 27-2. at 4-2 July 26. 1970).
141. 1,0 B.R. 213, 119191.
142. I. at 218.
143. United States %.Conyers, 3 B.R. 227 1932): United States N. Africa, 3 B.R. 3291 1932): United
Staies v. Sierer. II B.R. 213 11943).
144. See notes 121-140, supra. and accompanying text.
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Military Appeals holding in United States v. Ginyard, 141 however,
applies Hirshberg to all discharges and reenlistments. t' A close look at
Hirshberg reveals the fallacy of such an application. As the Supreme
Court pointed out in its recitation of the facts, Hirshberg was "granted
an honorable discharge because of expiration of his prior enlistment. ',41
This precise statement of the factual posture of the case is significant
in the Court's examination of the "manner in which court-martial
jurisdiction has long been exercised by the Army and Navy .. ."14t All of
the long-standing military prattices expressly relied upon by the Court
for aid in interpreting the scope of jurisdiction on the facts before it
dealt either with situations where an individual had been discharged
and was out of the service or where the discharge came at the expiration
of an obligated term of service and the individual reenlisted. 9 After
reviewing an opinion rendered by the Attorney General in 1919,' the
Court noted that, prior to that opinion "neither the Navy nor Army
had ever claimed court-martial power to try their personnel for offenses
committed prior to an honorable discharge where proceedings had
not been instituted before discharge." ' This statement is absolutely
correct when strictly limited to the facts before the Court. As early as
1917, however, jurisdiction had been found to continue after an honorable
discharge when the discharge did not interrupt the individual's military
status. 2 In the same vein, the Court's statement that before 1932 "both
Army and Navy had for more than half a century acted on the implicit
assumption that discharged servicemen, whether re-enlisted or not,
were no longer subject to court-martial power,"'53 is only accurate
when limited to the situation of a discharge at the expiration of the
obligated term of service. The line of military cases previously discussed
clearly established both the general rule that a discharge at the expiration
of a term of service terminates jurisdiction and the exception, i.e., the
uninterrupted status theory.'54 Furthermore, the Supreme Court was
aware of the rule that a discharge that does not interrupt military status
does not terminate jurisdiction.55 The above quoted statements of the
Court, considered in light of the Court's awareness of the "uninterrupted
status" rule, clearly indicate that the Hirshberg decision applies only to
145. 16 C.M.A. 512. 37 C. M.R. 132 19671.
146. Id. at 516. 37 C.M.R. at 136. See also United States v. Robson. 16 C.M.A. 527. 37 C.M.R. 147
(1967): United States v. Justice. 2 M.J. 344 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976). aftd on reconsideration,. 2 M. 623
(A.F.C.M.R. 1977).
147. Hirshberg v. Cooke. 336 U.S. 210, 211 (1949) {emphasis added).
148. Id at 216.
149. Id. at 216-217. See notes 121-140. stpJra. and accompanying text.
150. Hirshberg v. Cooke. 336 U.S. 210. 216 11949). citing 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 521, 529 (1919).
151. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 3M U.S. 210, 216t1949).
152. United States v. Brigham. No. CM 10467711917). See notes 128-131, supra, and accompanying
text.
153. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210. 218 t1949).
154. See notes 121-140, supra, and accompanying text.
155. Brief for Appellant at 39-4 1. Hirshberg v. Cooke. 336 U.S. 210 (1949).
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a discharge received at the expiration of a period of obligated service.
In view of the fact that Hirshberg was discharged at the expiration of
his term of enlistment and that the Court expressly relied upon "long
standing" practices within the services in interpreting the jurisdictional
statutes of the Navy,'56 it simply cannot be said that the case stands for
the proposition that all discharges, without exception, terminate juris-
diction. Such a view disregards one of the very principles upon which
the decision was based, i.e., long-standing practices of the services
should be given "great weight" in determining the scope of court-
martial jurisdiction granted by Congress.'57
Decisions by the Boards of Review after Hirshberg and prior to the
enactment of the Code recognized the true scope of the Hirshberg rule
and held accordingly.'
156, Hirshberg v. Cooke. 336 U.S. 210. 217 (1949). See note 9, supra.
157. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 216 (1949).
158. In United States v. Aikens. 5 B.R.-J.C. 331 (A.B.R. 1949): af'd, 5 B.R.-J.C. 375 (Judicial
Council 1949). the Board of Review noted that
the rule stated in the Hirshberg case . . applies in situations where the soldier's term of
enlistment has expired or where he has been separated from the service and a hiatus oc-
curred between his discharge and subsequent reenlistment, no such rule has been adhered
to by The Judge Advocate General of the Army in cases where soldiers are dischargedprior
to the expiration of their terms of service for the convenience of the Government, either
for purposes of reenlistment or acceptance of a commission: I indeed, the exact opposite is
true.
Id. at 354 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Board considered the line of decisions
discussed above and held that
Islince the accused reenlisted prior to the expiration of their terms of service and since
they were not physically separated from the service prior to reenlistment, their discharges
under such circumstances did not constitute a complete release from the military service.
Thus. there was no break or hiatus in their military status and their military service was
continuous and uninterrupted from the date of the commission of the offense in question
I murderl until the date of trial.
Id. at 358.
The case of United States v. Butcher. 10 B.R.-J.C. 223 (A.B.R. 1951). presented the unique
opportunity for the application of both the general rule. i e., the Hirshberg rule, and the "uninterrupted
status" rule. The accused, a first lieutenant at the time of trial, was separated from active duty on
March 29. 1950. while serving as a commissioned officer. The orders releasing him from active duty
were unconditional and served to relieve the accused from active duty and revert him to a reserve
status. The following day. the accused enlisted for a term of three years in the Regular Army. Five
months later, orders were issued appointing the accused to the grade of reserve first lieutenant, with
an entry date of September 21. 1950. The accused was discharged on September 20 and reported for
duty the following day as a commissioned officer. He was tried in December 1950 on several
specifications of failure to support his lawful wife. The periods of nonsupport covered all three
periods in question. that is, (1) the period ending March 29, 1950, in which the accused was an officer:(2) the five-month period of his enlistment: and (3) the period in which he was reappointed as a
commissioned officer. Id at 229-30. After a thorough review of precedent. the Board found that the
orders releasing the accused from active duty on March 29, 1950. "manifested the intent that the
accused be wholly released from the Army and his return to civilian life.' Id. at 232. For this reason,
the enlistment on the following day did not revive jurisdiction over offenses committed prior to the
separation. The discharge on September 20, 1950, however, did not have the same purpose as the
prior discharge and was accorded a different treatment. In the words fo the Board:
On 20 September 1950, two years, seven months and ten days prior to the expiration of his
contractual term of service, he received a discharge for the convenience of the Govern-
ment, for the purpose of allowing him to report for active duty as an officer on the next day.
The following day, 21 September 1950. he entered on active duty as an officer and is pres-
ently serving in such capacity. Under the rules hereinbefore stated, we find that the dis-
charge received by the accused on 20 September 1950 served merely to terminate his
enlisted service but not the military service to which he hadengaged himself on 30 March
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In light of the foregoing analysis, it becomes quite clear that Hirshberg
does not stand for as broad a proposition as the Ginyardrule implies.
Congress was aware of the Hirshberg decision when it enacted the
Code, therefore it is necessary to carefully examine the legislative
history of Article 3(a) for some indication that Congress intended to
modify the Hirshberg holding in a manner that would justify or support
the Ginyard decision.
Article 3(a), as originally proposed, bore little resemblance to the
present version. It was aimed at maintaining jurisdiction over reservists
for offenses committed while in a status in which they were subject to
the Code, notwithstanding the fact that they had reverted to inactive
1950, and that offenses committed by the accused on and after 30 March 1950 are subject
to military jurisdiction.
Id. at 233.
The case of United States v. Solinsky, 2 C.M.A. 153, 7 C.M.R. 29 (1953), as well as several Board of
Review opinions rendered after adoption of the Code, followed the same rationale. See United States
v. Isidore, 7 C.M.R. 595 fA.F.B.R. 1952); United States v. Rohde, 23 C.M.R. 481 (A.B.R. 1957);
United Statesv. Witty. 23 C.M.R. 515(A.B.R. 1957); UnitedStatesv. Lucas, 19C.M.R.613(A.F.B.R.
1955).
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 11951). promulgated pursuant to Exec. OrderNo. 10,214, 3 C.FR. 408 (1949-1953 Compilation), as authorized by the rule-making power Congress
delegated to the President in Article 36 of the Code, also recognized the "uninterrupted status"
theory as an e:iception to the general rule that a discharge terminates jurisdiction. Paragraph I I of
that work provides, in part:
11. TERMINATION OF JURISDICTION. -a. General rule. -The general rule is that
court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, midshipmen, warrant officers, enlisted
persons, and other persons subject to the code ceases on discharge from the service or
other termination of such status and that jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a
period of service or status thus terminated is not revived by re-entry into the military
service or return to such status.
b. Exceptions.-To this general rule there are. however, some exceptions which include
the following:
In those cases when the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his
status as a person belonging to the general category of persons subject to the code, court-
martial jurisdiction does not terminate. Thus when an officer holding a commission in aReserve component of an armed force is discharged from that commission, while on active
duty, by reason of his acceptance of a commission in a Regular component of that armedforce, there being no interval between the periods of service under the respective com-
missions, there is no termination of the officer's military status- merely the accomplish-
ment of a change in his status from that of a temporary to that of a permanent officer-
and court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense committed prior to such discharge
is not terminated by the discharge. Similarly, when an enlisted person is discharged for
the convenience of the Government in order to re-enlist before theexpirationof hts prior
period of service, military jurisdiction continues provided there is no hiatus between the
two enlistments. A member of the armed forces who receives a discharge therefrom while
serving without the continental limits of the United States and without the Territories
enumerated in Article 2(11), and who immediately becomes a person accompanying,
serving, or employed by the armed forces in such an oversea area, remains amenable totrial by court-martial for offenses committed prior to his discharge because such discharge
does not interrupt his status as a person subject to the code. So also a dishonorably dis-
charged prisoner in the custody o an armed force may be tried for an offense committed
while a member of the armed forces and prior to the execution of his dishonorable discharge.
Id. at para. I1. It must be noted that the rule-making powerof the President cannot be used to expandjurisdiction beyond the limits set by Congress. See Hirshberg v. Cooke. 336 U.S. 210 11949). The
manual provision is, however, evidence of the "manner in which court-martial jurisdiciton has long
been exercised" by the services and should be given "great weight" by the courts in interpreting the
scope of jurisdiction granted by Congress. Id. at 216.
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duty. "'59 This provision was bitterly attacked by members of various
reserve organizations who feared that such a broad grant of jurisdiction
could be used to harass reservists by involuntarily recalling them to
active duty to hold them accountable for even minor infractions of
discipline committed while on active duty. 6 ' It should be noted that
this provision would have allowed jurisdiction "whether or not such
status had terminated... ."I6 In the case of a reservist, this would be a
reversion to inactive duty or, in the words of Colonel Winthrop, the
individual would be more of a "civil person" than a "military person."
Responding to the criticism of such a broad expansion of military
jurisdiction and cognizant of the Supreme Court's holding in Hirshberg,
Congress took steps to amend Article 3(a). In discussing the original
version of Article 3(a) before a subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, Mr. Felix Larkin, Assistant General Counsel to
the Secretary of Defense, pointed out that the proposed section did
not deal with a Hirshberg situation.'62 Congressman Elston responded
that both maintaining jurisdiction over reservists and correcting the
Hirshberg result could be reached "with a very simple provision to the
effect that any person who commits any offense and is subject to pro-
secution under this code may be prosecuted even though he may no
longer be in the service and the only exceptions would be cases which
are barred by the statute of limitations."' 6 As the discussion continued,
the committee members expressed concern that an individual might
escape prosecution for murder committed the day before his or her
enlistment expired by "steplping] out of the service. 1 64 Mr. Larkin
framed the question before the committee as "whether you can abide,
missing the few cases of that kind, or whether there should be provided
across-the-board jurisdiction for people who do not reenlist and are
not Reservists. "'65 Framing the issue in that manner makes it appear
159. ARTICLE 3. Jurisdiction to try certain personnel.
(a) Reserve personnel of the armed forces who are charged with having committed, while
in a status in which they are subject to this Code, any offense against this Code may be re-
tained in such status or, whether or not such status has terminated, placed in an active
duty status for disciplinary action, without their consent, but not for a longer period of
time than may be required for such action.
Uniform Code of Militart Justice: Hearitngs on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcontm. ol'the House Cotmm.
on Armed Serices. 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1949). In explaining the purpose behind this provision
to members of the subcommittee, Robert Smart of the Committee's professional staff commented
that Article 3(a) was designed to give "continuing jurisdiction over Reserve personnel on inactive
duty if it is discovered while they are on inactive duty that they committed an offense while they were
on active duty or in a status under the code." Id. at 880.
160. Untiform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on H.R. 4080 Before the House Committee on
Armed Services. 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1330 (1949); Hearitngs on H.R. 2498. supra note 159. at 883.
161. See note 159. supra.
162. Hearings on H.R. 2498, supra note 159, at 881.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 882.
165. Id. Mr. Larkin added that the questions of jurisdiction over reservists on inactive duty who
committed an offense while on active duty. jurisdiction over individuals who committed offenses
while in the service but have since become civilians, and jurisdiction over a "Hirshberg style"
reenlistment should be decided as "one whole problem rather than by a piecemeal approach." Id.
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that the committee was working under the tacit assumption that one
who does reenlist is subject to military jurisdiction. Congressman De
Graffenried, a member of the committee, added that Article 3(a)
should be amended to provide that jurisdiction "should be fixed as of
the time the crime is committed and the mere fact that he is discharged
at a later date and returns to civilian life ought not to free him from
being prosecuted in a military court for an offense that he committed
,while he was in the service." 166 In response to Congressman De
Graffenried's suggestion, Congressman Brooks proposed that some
sort of limitation should be incorporated "so that minor infractions of
discipline would not be taken advantage of to bring a man back under
the jurisdiction of a court-martial."' 167 Mr. Robert Smart of the committee's
professional staff pointed out that Congressman Brooks' suggestion
concerned the major area of criticism of the proposed version; the fear
expressed by members of the reserve components that Article 3(a)
could be used to "pull them back into the service and away from their
business for comparatively minor offenses as a harassing movement."'"
It was at this point in the hearing that the limitations on punishment
and civil jurisdiction were raised and added to Article 3(a). The
significant point to note is that the committee was discussing a situation
where an individual was not on active duty when the exercise of
jurisdiction was contemplated. The committee discussion is replete
with phrases such as "not on active duty," "left the service," "out of the
Army," and "returns to civilian life."'" Read in its entirety and considering
the comments in the context in which they were made, it becomes
abundantly clear that the committee was contemplating, not a Ginyard,
"short" discharge situation, but a factual situation where an individual
had committed an offense and was not on active duty when jurisdiction
was sought to be exercised. 7 ' Of course, the subcommittee was aware
of the Hirshberg holding, but, in the minds of the committee, Hirshberg
was important, not for its specific type of discharge, but for the serious-
ness of the offense and the fact that such an offense might go
unpunished.7 ' With this in mind, Article 3(a) was revised and resubmitted
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167 Id
168. Id. at 883.
169. See notes 159-168, supra, and accompanying text.
170. See id.
171. The following exchange among committee members places Hirshberg in its proper perspective:
Mr. Brooks. Perhaps a limitation would be in order.
Mr. Smart. Yes, I think it might be well for the committee to consider the possibilities of
amending this article further to provide that courts-martial could try only those cases in-
volving major offenses which were not triable in the civil courts.
Mr. Elston. In other words, if a man committed murder the day before his period of en-
listment expired-
Mr. Smart. In the United States.
Mr. Elston. Yes; we will say he was in the United States and a certain State had the juris-
diction to try the case, they could not try him in the military courts?
Mr. Smart. That furthers, I think, the Reserve idea. Try everything in the civil courts you
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to the committee in its present form.' This examination of the
subcommittee hearing leaves no doubt that the primary concern was
with continuing jurisdiction over persons who had committed an
offense and then left active duty before being called to account for
their crimes. Congress was concerned with crimes going unpunished
because the particular individual accused was no longer a member of
the active forces and thus no longer subject to military law. The
limitations on jurisdiction in Article 3(a) were designed to prevent
civilians from being harassed and snatched away from their civilian
can if the accused iv not on active duty and limit prosecutions to major offenses.
Mr. Elston. I think that is a very good suggestion.
Mr. Hardy. Yes.
Mr. Elston. After all, the only purpose of this is to avoid a case like the Hirshberg case
or an' case where a person has conmitted a serious offense. I do not say it should include
minor offenses, but where he has conmitted a serious offense, heshould not he permitted
to escape bi reason of the.lact that he iv out o/ the Arm.
Mr. Larkin. That is right.
Mr. Elston. Whereas the same offense committed by a fellow who just enlisted would
bring prosecution.
Mr. Larkin. That is right.
Mr. Elston. It is not fair. And my suggested amendment would be that except as cases
are barred by the statute of limitations, jurisdiction shall continue as to major offenses
committed in the service even though a person has left the service. And then we might have
what Mr. Smart has suggested. Provided the offense is not one over which the States have
some jurisdiction and can proceed with the trial. That is the substance of it.
Mr. Larkin. I think we certainly would not object to that. And I think we can work out
some language. Although most of the comments against this article were that we were trying
to encroach and enlarge our jurisdiction, we would be happy with the restrictions of a
statute of limitations and not having jurisdiction over what is triable in the civil courts.
Mr. Hardy. I think you should give consideration to the point Mr. Brooks raised a while
ago that you do not pertnit niiiorordiciplinav oflenses totakea nin hack into the service
for militanv trial
Mr. Larkin. I agree.
Hearings ott H.R. 2498. supra note 159, at 883-84 (emphasis added). As the quoted excerpt makes
clear, the committee members were considering prosecution for one who committed an offense and
then became a civilian. The reference to Hirshberg was made to illustrate a serious offense and was
not mentioned for, nor was any special attention devoted to, the manner in which Hirshberg was
discharged.
172. After the professional staffredrafted Article3lal, it was again considered by the subcommittee:
Mr. Smart. I would next like to direct your attention to Article 3(a). which came in for
a lot of criticism. I think the ultimate opinion of the committee was that Reserves should
coiitinue to be subject to trial. or otlenses coninitted while ther were on active dutyi. even
after ther had returned to an inactive status if the offense were a serious offense and if
.the civil courts of this country. either State or Federal. had no jurisdiction to try the case.
With that understandiig there is some proposed language to accomplish that. May I
read it, sir?
Mr. Brooks. Will you read it?
Mr. Smart (reading): Subject to the provisions of Article 43-Any person charged with
having committed an offense against this code punishable by confinement for 5 years or
more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any
State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia while in a status in which he was
subject to this code. shall not be relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial by reason
of the termination of such status.
Now. that will get the Hirshberg case where he reenlisted. It would get Hirshberg even
though he had not reenlisted
Mr. Brooks. That will close up that loophole'?
Mr. Smart. In my opinion it will. sir.
Mr. Brooks. What is your opinion?
Mr. Elston. I am inclined to feel it would.
Mr. Brooks. All right, if there is no objection, then we will adopt that language.
Hearings on H.R. 2498. supra note 159. at 1262 (emphasis added).
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jobs and community to face charges for relatively minor infractions of
discipline. 73 The legislative history is devoid of any indication that
Congress intended Article 3(a) to operate as a bar to punishing a
soldier on active duty for offenses committed while on active duty. Mr.
Smart of the House Armed Services Subcommittee professional staff
reported that the "ultimate opinion of the committee was that Reserves
should continue to be subject to trial, for offenses committed while
they were on active duty, even after they had returned to an inactive
status if the offense[s were... serious ... and if the civill ian I courts...
had no jurisdiction . . . ."I" As the above excerpt makes clear, the
concept of "termination of status" as used in the present version of
Article 3(a) referred to a situation in which a reservist reverted to
inactive duty and in which the individual was no longer a "member of a
regular component." The original version of Article 3(a) used this
same concept to denote the same thing.'75 It-can be seen that the
discharge in Ginyard was not even close to the degree of separation
from the active forces that arose when a reservist terminated his active
status and returned to his civilian occupation and inactive duty.
Further evidence of the congressional intent underlying the use of
the phrase "termination of status" rather than "discharge" or "prior
enlistment" can be found in other areas of the legislative history of
Article 3(a). Thus, after approval of the amended version of Article
3(a) by the subcommittee, a hearing was held before the full House
Armed Services Committee.'76 The subcommittee report noted that
the military had been "reluctant to prosecute the average offender
who succeeds in returning to civilian status before the discovery of his
crime," but that the authorities found themselves faced with a lack of
jurisdiction in aggravated cases of "this character."'"7 In discussing
173. Id. at 883.
174. Id. at 1262. See note 172. supra.
175. See note 159, supra.
176. Unilrmn Code q/ Militar
, 
Justice: Hearings on H. R. .341 and H. R. 4080 Before the House
Comm. on Artned Services, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 119491.
177. Id. at 1330. In addition to Hirshberg. the report also discussed Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F.2d
288. (4th Cir. 1948). as an illustration of the evils Article 3(a) was designed to cure.
In that case, Captain Durant was serving in Germany as officer in charge of the Kronberg Castle in
1945. In March 1946, Captain Durant returned to the United States, out-processed from the Army,
and was placed on terminal leave. She was given self-executing orders that terminated her active
service on May30, 1946. On May 24. 1946, the Secretary of War ordered that Captain Durant's orders
be revoked as of May 28, 1946. and for her to report to Fort Sheridan, Illinois, for active duty. She
failed to comply with the orders and was arrested by military police on June3, 1946. Captain Durant
was then returned to Germany, court-martialed, and convicted of stealing the crown jewels of Hesse
which had been stored in Kronberg Castle for safekeeping during her tenure as officer in charge.
Captain Durant filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the
Army was without jurisdiction to try her since her period of active service ended on March 9, 1946.
when her terminal leave began. The district court ruled that Captain Durant was not amenable to
jurisdiction and issued the writ. Durant v. Hironimus. 73 F. Supp. 79. (S.D.W.Va. 1947). The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that an officer on terminal leave is in a status
subject to the Code and as such is amenable to court-martial.
Congress recognized the fact that had the military waited until after the execution date on the
orders to prefer charges, jurisdiction would have been lost because Captain Durant would have
become a civilian and thus not subject to military law. The fact that the offense occurred overseas
precluded trial in the civilian courts ol this country. Article 3(a) was aimed at filling this jurisdictional
void. Hearings on H.R. 3341 and H.R. 4080, supra note 176, at 1330.
316- The Air Force Law Review/1979
HeinOnline  -- 21 A.F. L. Rev. 316 1979
Hirshberg, the report said that "Hirshberg's term of enlistment expired
and after 1 day he reenlisted." This version of the Hirshberg facts
indicates that the subcommittee felt that Hirshberg was totally processed
out of the Navy and, subsequent to his discharge, he decided to
reenlist."' 8 This being the case, it is unimportant, as far as determining
the intent of Congress, whether or not Hirshberg was processed in an
abbreviated manner in contemplation of his reenlistment. The report
goes on to state that the Article 3(a) limitations as to the seriousness of
the offense and availability of civil courts "will provide ample protection
against any capricious action on the part of military authorities." ' 9
Since it could hardly be considered capricious to court-matrial a
soldier while on active duty for crimes committed during active duty
and within the statute of limitations, this phrase must be referring to
the fear expressed by the reservists that Article 3(a) would be used to
pull them away from their civilian occupation to answer for minor
infractions of discipline. The report by the committee to the House of
Representatives was the same as the report from the subcommittee to
the full committee. 80
The course of debate over Article 3(a) in the Senate sheds more
light upon the intended meaning and application of that statute. When
the proposed code, as amended and passed by the House of Representa-
tives, 8' reached the Senate, a comprehensive amendment was introduced
to significantly alter many provisions.'82 One such amendment conferred
jurisdiction on the United States district courts to try individuals,
whose status had been terminated, for offenses committed against the
Code."' The Judge Advocate General of the Army made a statement
supporting the Senate amendments, stating: "Insofar as Army and Air
Force personnel are concerned, Articles 2(3) and 3(a) of the Code
extend military jurisdiction over persons not now subject to it.' 8t 4 The
Judge Advocate General was obviously referring to a situation where
the accused was totally separated from service, since at that time
jurisdiction did exist over the Ginyard type discharge. The proposed
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. H.R. REP. No. 491. 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
181. 95 CONG. REC. 5744 11949).
182. 96 CONG. REC 1294 11950).
183. The full text of the amendment as it dealt with Article 3(a), is as follows:
(a) Subject to the provisions of article 43, jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the several
district courts of the United States to try and punish according to the applicable provisions
and limitations of this code and the regulations made thereunder-
S) any person charged with having committed an offense against this code while in a status
in which he was subject to this code which status has been terminated;
(2) any person of the Reserve component of the armed forces for an offense against this
code committed while such person is on inactive duty training authorized by written orders
which are voluntarily accepted by such person;
(3) retired personnel of a Regular component of the armed forces who are charged with
having committed an offense against this code and who are entitled to receive pay.
184. Id. See also Uni/orn Code of MilitarY Justice: Hearings on S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before a
Subcontn. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 255, 256, 266 (1949).
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amendment was defeated and Article 3(a) emerged in the same form
as passed by the House.'85 The Senate reported:
Article 3(a) provides continuing jurisdiction over certain persons who
have left the service and who heretofore have been immune from
prosecution. Under this section, however, such persons are subject to
this code, whenever the Federal courts do not have jurisdiction, and
when the offense is serious enough to call for at least 5 years sentence
and was committed within the statute of limitations. 86
It should be noted that the Senate Report speaks of "persons who have
left the service and who heretofore have been immune from prosecu-
tion." Again, as the previously discussed line of military cases clearly
establishes, an individual receiving the type of discharge that Specialist
Ginyard received was not "heretofore" immune for prosecution.'87
Aside from the actual debates and discussions within Congress,
there are other indications of congressional intent that should have
been examined by the Ginyard court. For example, Article 2(1)88 of
the Code provides for jurisdiction over an individual whose term of
service has expired but who has not been discharged. Thus, it has been
held that when steps are taken "with a view to trial" before the
expiration of an individual's term of service, his discharge can be
withheld pending court-martial. 8 9 This exercise of jurisdiction is justified
185:" 96 CONG. REC. 1446 (1950). During the Senate's consideration of the Code, Senator Pat
McCarran, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, moved to have the proposed legislation
referred to his committee for further study and deliberation. Id. at 1412. In a letter addressed to
Senator Millard E. Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator McCarran
expressed his concern that certain aspects of the bill, specifically Article 3(a), would deprive "former
Iservicel personnel" of the usual rights of a civilian trial, and thus the bill should receive the scrutiny
of his committee. Id. at 1366. In reply, Senator Tydings noted that Article 31 a) was designed to cover
three situations; II) reservists who go on inactive duty; (2) persons who are discharged from the
service; and (3) persons who, although once discharged, reentered the service. Senator Tydings citedHirshberg as an example of the latter category and noted that the discharge in Hirshberg prevented
court-martial "even though he was out oftheservice for one day only." Id. at 1367 (emphasis added).
He added that Navy reservists were already subject to similar jurisdiction and that Article 3(a) was
designed to extend that jurisdiction to the other services and cover cases "over which there is nopresent jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added). The Senator's characterization of the Hirshberg facts
clearly indicates that, in his mind, the discharge in Hirshberg was one which entirely severedHirshberg's connection with the military. His assertion as to the lack of present jurisdiction also
indicates that Article 3(a) was designed to expand jurisdiction and was not intended to be applied in a
Ginyard situation
186. See S. REP. NO. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
187. See notes 128-143, supra, and accompanying text.
188. 10 U.S.C. §80211) (1976).
189. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. UNITED STATES, para. I ld (1969 rev. ed.). See, e.g.. UnitedStates v. Brown, 13 C.M.R. 856 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (jurisdiction sustained where charges were preferred
and the accused was given notice prior to the expiration of his commission, even though charges
were not actually served on the officer until after the date of expiration); United States v. Estrada, 18
C.M.R. 872 )A.F.B.R. 1955), pet. denied. 19 C.M.R. 413 (C.M.A. 1955) (accused formally charged
and placed in pretrial confinement prior to expiration of enlistment; subsequent to expiration date
new offenses were charged and jurisdiction sustained). See also WINTHROP, supra note 3, at 90 (arrest
or service of charges before expiration or discharge sufficient for jurisdiction to attach). The latest
word from the Court of Military Appeals in this area is United States v. Hutchins, 4 M.J. 190 (C.M.A.
1978) where jurisdiction was sustained even though no formal charges or actions were taken prior to
the expiration date of the accused's enlistment, but the accused did not demand his discharge and
continued his service until charges were preferred.
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on the grounds of the need for discipline. It would adversely effect a
unit's discipline, so the argument goes, if a soldier were allowed to
commit various offenses right before discharge and the service was
powerless to take action.'90 Recognizing that jurisdiction under Article
2(1) has been acknowledged by the federal courts, 19' it must be assumed
that such jurisdiction meets the constitutional requirements calling for
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."'92 Why then,
would Congress provide for jurisdiction in a situation where the soldier
is held involuntarily, and in the very next article of the Code abandon
jurisdiction (that had existed for years) when the soldier voluntarily
remains in the service?
In the former situation, the soldier is being held involuntarily,
resulting in a stronger argument for the application of the protections
of the civilian system, while in the latter, the soldier has voluntarily
elected to remain in the service and accept the concommittant rights,
duties, rules, and regulations. Similarly, the impact on unit discipline is
arguably less since the recalcitrant soldier will no longer be present in
the organization, while the soldier in a Ginyard situation will be a
constant reminder to both commanders and troops that he "beat the
system." It simply does not follow that Congress would labor long and
hard to enact the Uniform Code of Military justice in order to provide
a system tailored to the special needs and considerations of the armed
forces and purposely create such conflicting and illogical jurisdictional
results as the above example illustrates. Article 2(1) of the Code
contains no limitations or qualifications as to jurisdiction over service
personnel on active duty. By its very terms it includes all "members of
a regular component of the armed forces."'193 Congress did not see fit to
limit the amenability to court-martial of a person on active duty to only
those offenses committed during the current enlistment. As Article
2(1) is the basic grant of jurisdiction over individuals on active duty,
such a limitation, if intended, would seem to belong in that provision.
Of similar significance in determining the overall jurisdictional
intent of Congress is Article 2(4)194 which makes "[rletired members of
a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay"
subject to the Code.'95 Although infrequently exercised and subject to
190. WINTHROP. supra note 3, at 90:
In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished.
It is held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his
right to a discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against
him-as by an arrest or the service of charges- the military jurisdiction will fully attach
and once attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the
end of the term of the enlistment of the accused.
191. See Roman v. Critz, 291 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1968), application for star of court-martial
denied, 393 U.S. 921 11968).
192. Toth v. Quarles. 350 U.S. 11.23 (1955). citing Anderson v. Dunn. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204. 230-
231 1821) (emphasis removed).
193. 10 U.S.C. §802(1) (1976).
194. Id § 802)4).
195. Id.
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policy limitations by the various services,'96 this provision has been
invoked by the military and upheld on collateral attack in the civilian
courts. 97 More important than the actual use of the provision, however,
196. E.g., D.A.P. 27-174, para. 4-5(c)(6)( 1976)(" Rletired personnel subject to the Code will not be
tried for any offense by any military tribunal unless extraordinary circumstances are present linking
them to the military establishment or involving them in conduct inimical to the welfare of the
nation."); A.F.M. I 11-1. para. 2-6 (C-3, Nov. 15, 1978) ("Retired Regular Air Force personnel, who
are entitled to receive pay, are not to be tried by court-martial unless their conduct clearly links them
with the military establishment or is adverse to the welfare of the United States and, even then, trial is
subject to prior approval thereof by the Secretary of the Air Force.").
197. The most celebrated of these cases is United States v. Hooper, 9 C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417
(1958), in which a Navy admiral on the retired list was tried and convicted of sodomy by a Navy court-
martial. The Court of Military Appeals per Quinn, C.J., upheld the constitutionality of Article 2(4) by
reasoning that retired members of a regular component, entitled to receive pay, were a part of the
"land and naval forces" and thus Congress could constitutionally subject them to military law. In
reaching this conclusion Chief Judge Quinn stated:
Officers on the retired list are not mere pensioners in any sense of the word. They form a
vital segment of our national defense for their experience and mature judgment are relied
upon heavily in times of emergency. The salaries they receive are not solely recompense
for past services, but a means devised by Congress to assure their availability and prepared-
ness in future contingencies. This preparedness depends as much upon their continued res-
ponsiveness to discipline as upon their continued state of physical health. Certainly, one
who is authorized to wear the uniform of his country, to use the title of his grade, who is
looked upon as a model of the military way of life, and who receives a salary to assure his
availability, is part of the land or naval forces.
Id at 645. 26 C.M.R. at 425. Admiral Hooper argued the same jurisdictional question before the
United States Court of Claims in a suit to recover his retired pay which was discontinued by the
sentence of the court-martial. Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982(Ct. Cl. 1964). cert. denied. 377
U.S. 977 (1964). In denying the petitioner's claim, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244 (1882) where a retired Army captain sued to establish his right to
receive the benefit of a statute (Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 24, 16 Stat. 320) which increased the
pay of officers ten percent for each five year's of service. The Supreme Court framed the issue as
"whether an officer thus situated I retiree from active service entitled to periodic compensation I is in
the service, within the meaning of the increased compensation statute]." Id. at 245. The Court stated
that it was
impossible to hold that men who are by statute declared to be a part of the army, who may
wear its uniform, whose names shall be borne upon its register, who may be assigned by
their superior officers to specified duties by detail as other officers are, who are subject to
the rules and articles of war, and may be tried, not by a jury, as other citizens are, but by a
military court-martial, for any breach of those rules, and who may finally be dismissed on
such trial from the service in disgrace, are still not in the military service.
Id at 246 (emphasis in original). Relying on the Supreme Court's assumption that Congress could
subject a retiree to the Articles of War and maintain jurisdiction over him, the Court of Claims
affirmed the constitutionality of Article 2)4) and denied Admiral Hooper's claim.
Also sustaining the constitutionality of Article 2)4) was Chambers v. Russell. 192 F. Supp. 425
(N.D. Cal. 1961). where the petitioner, a retired Naval officer, was arrested and charged by the Navy
for various acts of sodomy allegedly committed while he was still on active duty. While confined
waiting trial he sought a writ of habeas corpus challenging the Navy's jurisdiction. In finding that
there was a sufficient connection between the petitioner and the Navy for the exercise of jurisdiction
to be constitutional, the court noted that one on the retired list. besides receiving pay, was entitled to
wear the uniform, was afforded use of commissary stores and other facilities, as well as being entitled
to medical care from the service. Id. at 427. These connections, as well as the Supreme Court's
language in Trier were sufficient to convince the court of Article 2(4)'s constitutionality. Id. at 427-
28.
For a detailed discussion of the Hooper and Chaibers cases, as well as other aspects of military
jurisdiction over those who are not full-time members of the armed services. see Bishop, Court-
Martial Jurisdiction Over Militari-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars. Reservists. and Discharged
Prisoners. 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1964). In discussing Chambers, Professor Bishop notes that the
charged offenses were triable in the local civilian courts but that "I Alrticle3la) could by itsown terms
have no application" since that provision presupposes that the accused's status as a person subject to
the Code has terminated subsequent to the offense. Since Chambers went from a status in which he
was subject to the Code, i.e., active duty, to a retired status which also subjected him to the Code,
Professor Bishop reasons that status was uninterrupted and thus Article 3(a) was not applicable. Id.
at 343 & n. 113. The court in Chambers applied the same reasoning to avoid an Article 3(a) issue.
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is the indication it gives of congressional intent in the area of jurisdiction.
By its very terms, Article 2(4) retains jurisdiction over individuals who
have severed all connections with the military except the right to
receive retirement pay and benefits. There seems to be no compelling
need for such jurisdiction to exist. Additionally, there was considerable
controversy surrounding this provision in Congress."' The fact remains,
however, that jurisdiction does exist in this situation and it exists with
no limitation as to the sort of offense charged. Again the question must
be asked, Why would Congress maintain jurisdiction over individuals
with such a tenuous connection with the service and, in the next
breath, abandon jurisdiction over an individual who is still serving on
active duty? The justification for Article 2(4) appears to be the need to
maintain some disciplinary controls over retirees. The justification for
maintaining jurisdiction over retirees who have practically no contact
with the active forces cannot compare with the need of the military to
deal with crimes committed by those currently on active duty. Thus,
the incongruity between Article 2(4) and the court's interpretation of
Article 3(a) casts further doubt on the correctness of the Ginyard
decision.
The above survey of evidence of the congressional intent underlying
Article 3(a) indicates that Congress was concerned with closing a loop-
hole or gap in military jurisdiction. To accomplish this purpose, Congress
enacted a statute that greatly expanded the military's jurisdiction.'99
Congress did not focus solely on the Hirshberg case in which a discharge
at the expiration of a period of service prevented court-martial for
crimes committed prior to the discharge and reenlistment. Instead, it
went considerably beyond the Hirshberg situation and included within
the jurisdiction of a military court those who were no longer a part of
the armed forces.2°° The broad expansion of jurisdiction under Article
3(a) certainly carried Hirshberg along in its wake and closed that
loophole in jurisdiction.,' The Ginyard court would have us believe,
however, that this same jurisdiction-expanding provision was also
designed to create a loophole that heretofore had never existed.
Applying pre-Code law to the facts of Ginyard yields an opposite
result. A discharge prior to the expiration of an obligated term of
service did not interrupt the individual's status as a person subject to
military law and therefore jurisdiction did not terminate. Yet, the
court's application of Article 3(a)-a jurisdiction-expanding provision-
creates a loophole where none had previously existed.2"2 Such a result
was not in concert with the intent of Congress. It is true that Congress
was concerned with punishing offenders for major crimes committed
198. See. e.g.. Hearings on H.R. 2498. supra note 161. at 706. 707. 864-67; Hearings on S. 857 and
H.R. 4080. supra note 185, at 1004)1, 147. It should be noted that retirees had been subject to military
law since 1861, thus Article 2(4) was not a wholly new concept. See Bishop, supra note 197, at 332.
199. See notes 159-187. supra. and accompanying text.
200. See notes 195-198. supra, and accompanying text.
201. Hearings on H.R. 2498. supra note 159, at 1262. See note 172. supra.
202. See notes 121-143. supra, and accompanying text.
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while on active duty. Minor infractions of discipline did not warrant
removing the individual from the civilian community to answer to
military authorities for his transgressions."" When viewed against the
full spectrum of criminal law, the crimes which go unpunished by
virtue of the Ginyard rule are not "major." 4 When viewed in the
context of the military environment, however, the same crimes become
major breaches of discipline. It is inconceivable, therefore, that Congress
intended Article 3(a) to be interpreted in a manner that directly
contradicts the very purpose of a separate system of military justice,
i.e., the maintenance of discipline within the armed forces.
The Ginyard decision does have one point in its favor-it accords
identical treatment to one who receives a "short" discharge prior to
the termination of an obligated term of service and to one who
receives his discharge at the completion of his obligated term. Similar
treatment in those two circumstances is desirable. In both cases, the
individual receives a discharge and immediately reenlists. In both
cases, the individual is never really out of the service, therefore there is
no compelling policy reason to afford different jurisdictional treatment
to the two situations. Article 3(a), however, does not compel different
treatment. The discussions among members of the House Armed
Services Committee centered on an individual's crimes going unpunished
because he was "out of the Army" or "returned to civilian life." The
original version of Article 3(a) spoke of one's status terminating when
a reservist left active duty and returned to his civilian job and the
civilian community. The present version of Article 3(a) also speaks of
status being terminated. However, there is absolutely nothing in the
legislative history or in the committee hearings to indicate that Congress
intended a different meaning to be afforded to that phrase. In fact, the
evidence is to the contrary. 05 The inescapable conclusion is that
termination of status within the meaning of Article 3(a) involves
something more than a mere discharge and immediate reenlistment.
When a soldier reenlists at the expiration of a term of service, he never
really leaves the service. He does not return to a civilian community
and a civilian occupation. His pay, rank, and privileges continue unin-
terrupted."° Any sort of severance from the armed forces is purely
fictional and has none of the attributes that Congress envisioned when
speaking of a reservist leaving active duty and returning to the civilian
community.
When drafting Article 3(a), Congress did not, as Judge Ferguson
asserted, enact the Hirshberg rule with certain qualifications.07 Congress
203. See notes 159-172. supra, and accompanying text.
204. See notes 21, 22. sura.
205. See notes 159-193. supra, and accompanying text.
206. See note 6, supra.
207. United States v. Noble. 13 C.M.A. 413. 416. 32 C.M.R. 413. 416 1962) (Ferguson. J..
dissenting):
I cannot agree with the subtle reasoning of my brothers, for I believe it disregards the stat-
utory enact ment in Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 3, 10 USC § 803, of a limited
version of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Hirshberg v. Cooke I citation omitted I.
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was influenced by the Hirshberg decision, but in the mind of Congress,
Hirshberg was totally out of the service and then reenlisted. In its view,
he was not given the sort of discharge provided those who desire
immediate reenlistment-one that never really severs the individual's
connection with the service." 8 Judge Ferguson's interpretation of
Hirshberg and Congress' interpretation of that case are entirely different.
Legislative history and congressional intent, not Hirshberg, must,
therefore, supply the test for determining when one's status as a person
subject to the Code terminates. As this article has demonstrated,
Congress intended for status to terminate when an individual left
active duty and returned to civilian life. Congress envisioned a significant
severance of the individual's ties with the active forces as the proper
test for termination of status, not the purely fictional break that occurs
when a career military member reaches the end of one period of
service and immediately embarks on another.
The case of Toth v. Quarles0 9 is an example of the application of
Article 3(a) consistent with congressional intent. In Toth, the accused
had been discharged and had severed all connections with the service
when he was apprehended and court-martialed for a murder allegedly
committed while he was stationed in Korea. 10 The Air Force invoked
Article 3(a) as jurisdictional authority to return the accused to Korea
for trial. The sister of the accused sought a writ of habeas corpus. The
district court granted the writ on the ground that Toth should not have
been returned to Korea without a hearing."' The court of appeals
reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued the writ
holding that Congress could not constitutionally extend military juris-
diction to "civilian ex-soldiers who had severed all relationship with
the miliary and its institutions.""2 The constitutional infirmity of Article
3(a) did not, however, alter the original intent as to the test for
termination of status. In Toth, the Air Force used Article 3(a) for the
exact purpose that Congress intended. Toth had severed his connections
with the military and returned to the civilian community.2 3 His crime,
208. See notes 159-198. supra, and accompanying text.
209. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
210. Id. at 13.
21 1. Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953).
212. Toth v. Quarles. 350 U.S. 11. 14(1955).
213. Id. at 13. The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 3(a) required the prior approval of the
secretary of the branch of service concerned. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. UNITED STAfES para.
lb (1951). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in reversing the district court in
Toth pointed out that "Islection 11(b) of the Manual is a safeguard interposed by the President
against the arbitrary subjection of civilians to trial by courts-martial for offenses committed while they
were in the service." Talbott v. Toth. 215 F. 2d 22, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (footnote omitted). The very
presence of the requirement to obtain prior approval before exercising jurisdiction under Article
(a) is compelling evidence of the interpretation the executive branch and the service departments
gave to Article 3(a). It was obviously felt that Article 3(a) was designed to reach civilians who had left
the service, thus the civilian head of the service department was required to approve its use. It would
seem to serve no useful purpose, however, to have the secretary of the service department pass on a
case where an individual, on active duty, is charged with an offense committed while on active duty.
Interestingly enough, the requirement for prior approval from the secretary of a military department
before using Article 3(a) was removed from the Manual when it was revised in 1969. MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES. para. I1b (1969 rev. ed.).
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however, was one that Congress felt should not go unpunished merely
because the perpetrator had returned to civilian life.2"4 The murder
Toth was charged with was committed in Korea, therefore, beyond the
jurisdiction of the American civilian courts."5 Thus, the limitations on
the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 3(a) were met and the Air
Force brought Toth before a court-martial. The fact that Congress did
not have the constitutional power to confer such jurisdiction does not,
however, justify the Ginyard court's judicial alteration of congressional
purpose and the subsequent application of Article 3(a) to a fact
situation that it was not designed to cover. The court should have
looked to the statute and its legislative history to determine if Ginyard's
status had terminated so as to make the Article 3(a) limitations on
jurisdiction applicable rather than fashioning a judicial expedient.2 6
214. Mr. Elston. You would have some very absurd situations.
Mr. Larkin. Exactly.
Mr. Elston. A man might commit murder the day before his term of enlistment was up and
step out of the service and could not be prosecuted.
Hearings on H.R. 2498, supra note 159, at 881-82 (1949).
215. IToth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13(1955). Before the court of appeals. the petitioner argued that
the alleged murder was committed on an air base in Korea and thus "at a place within the special
territorial jurisdiction of the United States;- therefore jurisdiction could not be exercised under
Article 3(a) since the offense was triable under 18 U.S.C. §3238 in the federal courts. Talbott v. Toth,
215 F. Supp. 22, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court rejected this argument since there was no authority for
the proposition that a military installation located in a foreign country was a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and, therefore. "the offenses with which Toth Iwas
charged could I notj be tried as offenses against the United States within the jurisdiction of a District
Court." Id. (citations omitted).
216. At this point the critical reader may respond with the familiar maxim that a statute unambiguous
on its face must be given effect as written without resort to extrinsic aid. Caminetti v. United States.
242 U.S. 470 (1917). But consider the following:
This rule is deceptive, however, in that it implies that words have intrinsic meanings ....
The assertion in a judicial opinion that a statute needs no interpretation because it is "clear
and unambiguous" is in reality evidence that the court has already considered and con-
strued the act. It may also signify that the court is unwilling to consider matter or evidence
bearing on the question as to how the statute should be construed, and is instead declaring
its effect on the basis of the judge's own uninstructed and unrationalized impression of its
meaning.
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 4 (4th ed. D. Sands 1973) (citations
omitted).
As has been illustrated, the Ginyard court's reliance upon Hirshberg for the proposition that all
discharges terminate status is untenable: therefore, the only other source for such a rule must be
derived from Article 3(a). The intent of Congress as derived through the legislative history, however,
also fails to support such a position. It would appear, then, that the above-quoted words of Justice
Sutherland may be applicable in explaining the Ginyard rule. In all fairness to Judges Kilday and
Ferguson, however, the briefs submitted by the Government in the Ginyard case did not, in the
opinion of the author, adequately examine and set forth the intent of the legislature. As a result, the
responsibility for this "uninstructed" interpretation of Article 3(a) cannot be placed entirely upon the
judicial shoulders of those two honorable and distinguished gentlemen.
Again. the critic may retort that Article 3(a) works to deny a certain class of individuals the rights
and protections afforded by the Constitution and should, therefore, be strictly construed. It has long
been the law, however, that even though a statute should be strictly construed, it should not be
construed so as to defeat the intent of the legislature. As Mr. Justice Story noted in United States v.
Winn. "the proper course in all these cases I construction of penal statutesl is to search out and follow
the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense of the words, which harmonizes best with the
context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature."
United States v. Winn, 28 F. Cas. 733. 734 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16, 740).
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IV. WHEN DOES STATUS TERMINATE? A PROPOSED RULE
Even though Ginyard was wrongly decided, it is, nevertheless, still
the law and must be recognized as such. The fact that it has endured
for some ten years, however, does not mean that it is "good law."
The broad language used by the court virtually eliminated any
loopholes or distinctions2 7 that might be argued to avoid application
of the rule. Furthermore, there is no empirical data available to
measure the impact the Ginyard decision has had on discipline. Since
the decision was handed down, the issue has been noticeably absent
from the decisions of the military appellate courts. Of course, this may
217. The Gin yard decision itself did not expressly overrule the Noble case where jurisdiction was
found to exist despite a discharge and reenlistment because "I legally and factually, the new term of
enlistment was a substitute for the original enlistment and its extensions." United States v. Noble, 13
C.M.A. 413,416, 32 C.M.R. 413. 416.(1962). In fact, Judge Kilday went to great lengths to distinguish
Noble from both Sleidley and Gittard. In discussing the lower court's holding sustaining jurisdiction
over Ginyard by relying on Noble. Judge Kilday stated:
The fact overlooked by the board of review in its analysis of Noble is that Noble presented a
special case. As the majority opinion therein points out, at the time he applied for a change
in the term of his service, Noble already was serving the second of his two extensions of his
original enlistment. He desired cancellation of the extension and restoration of the original
date of expiration. Because of the peculiar nature of the situation a "special" order was
issued which provided that the cancellation of the extensions was expressly made "contingent
upon" Noble's reenlistment.
United States v. Ginyard, 16 C.M.A. 512, 514, 37 C.M.R. 132. 134 (1967). He then noted that in
Stidle ' there was some doubt as to whether the discharge was unqualified or was one given prior to
the normal discharge date for the purpose of simultaneous reenlistment. In any case, he found that
the court in SteidleY was not "faced with the'special'situation found in Noble." ld. at 515.37 C.M.R.
at 135. Judge Kilday went on to state, "In the case at bar, we hold that our opinion in Steidlet is
applicable and that the court-martial did not have jurisdiction to try the accused for the charged
offenses." Id. at 516. 37 C.M.R. at 136. The court's efforts in distinguishing Noble and Steidlev and
then applying Steidler to resolve the case before it. would indicate that Noble is still a viable case and
would be an exception to the Gin yard rule that establishes a discharge as a bar to subsequent court-
martial for offenses committed prior to discharge unless saved by Article 3(a). Upon analysis,
however, the Noble and Gittard cases are so factually similar that there exists no rational basis for
distinction. Noble had an obligated extension cancelled so that he could immediately reenlist.
Ginyard reenlisted prior to the expiration of his term of service; therefore, he too, like Noble, had
some obligated period of service remaining unsatisfied when he reenlisted. Furthermore, there are
absolutely no policy reasons that would justify separate treatment of the two cases. For these
reasons, despite the mental gymnastics employed by the court in distinguishing Noble. Gitard must
be read as overruling that case and eliminating any "Noble exception." This view is shared by the only
court of review to pass on the question. United States v. Justice, 2 M.J. 3,34 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976). a/f'd
on reconsideration. 2 M.J. 623 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977).
Another false exception to the Gthtard rule that warrants mention was enunciated by Chief Judge
Quinn in United States v. Martin, 10 C.M.A. 636, 28 C.M.R. 202 11959). Martin was charged with
submitting false travel claims, an offense that was cognizable by both civilian and military courts.
Chief Judge Quinn sustained jurisdiction. even though the offenses were committed prior to a
discharge and reenlistment, because the accused was on active duty at the time of trial. Chief Judge
Quinn then added that frauds against the Government had been a basis of continuing jurisdiction for
almost one hundred years and. in his opinion, the Hirshberg case did not alter that basis for
jurisdiction. Id at 639. 28 C.M.R. at 205. What the ChiefJudge failed to realize, however, was that the
reason jurisdiction over frauds against the Government continued past a separation from the service
was because statutes had so provided. See e.g.. Article ofWar94. Act of June 4. 1920, ch. 227, art. 94,
41 Stat. 805-06; WINTHROP, stupra note 3, at 92. The Code repealed and replaced the prior statutes
and contains no specific jurisdictional rules governing frauds against the Government. These sorts of
offenses are, therefore, clearly within the Ginyard holding and cannot serve as the basis for an
exception. See United States v. Martin, 10 C.M.A. 636. 645-46. 28 C.M.R. 202, 211-12 11959)
(Ferguson. J.. dissenting). Accord. United States v. Justice, 2 M.J. 344,347 & n.4 i A.F.C.M.R. 1976).
There does exist, however, one type of offense that survives the Gittard rule. In discussing one of
the allegations of larceny in Steidlet'. Judge Ferguson states:
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be explained by the clarity of the court's rule. It is certainly a "simple
rule of easy interpretation."2'i
The fact that the decision in Ginyard has not caused the very
foundations of military discipline to crumble is not justification for
ignoring it. The military bar should be concerned because of the
unsound legal reasoning employed by the majority opinion. Commanders
and convening authorities should be concerned over the potential for
soldiers to escape appropriate discipline for breaches of military law.
It is of little consolation to commanders faced with a Ginyard-excused
offense that the rule of the case has not totally undermined the entire
system of discipline within the armed forces. Commanders are concerned
primarily with discipline in their unit and the impact on their organization
when one of its members can violate the rules and not only go unpunished
but retain all the benefits as well.2t9 It is for these reasons that Ginyard,
even though over ten years old, must be reexamined and corrected. To
accomplish this, there are essentially two avenues available to vitiate
There is nothing in the record to indicate the date on which any particular item set forth in
the specification was taken or to establish whether the theft occurred wholly during the
prior enlistment, wholly in accused's current service obligation, or partially in both. Under
the circumstances, we are unable to determine the extent to which the court-martial had
jurisdiction over the alleged offense. The matter may be resolved by the taking of evidence
and submission of the issue at the rehearing on sentence which, as hereinafter noted, we
deem necessary. See United States v. Ornelas, 2 USCMA 96, 6 CMR 96. I'it is determned
that the tlnse occurred in whole or in part duritg accused's existing enlitment it nmay he
considered appropriately by the cou rt-martial in imposiig punithment. I/ it iv determined
that it was comnitted during the prior terit al'service, th  law ofli'cer may apply the prit-
ct/es enunciated herein atd dismiss the speci/ication.
United States v. Steidley, 14 C.M.A. 108, 111, 33 C.M.R. 320, 323, (1963) (emphasis added). Thus,
despite the broad language of the Ginyard rule, a continuing crime or conspiracy-type offense would
not be affected by an intervening discharge as long as some act or element is present in the current
enlistment. United States v. Gladue, 4 M.I. I (C.M.A. 1977). See also United States v. Rhodes, II
C.M.A. 735, 742-43,29 C.M.R. 551, 558-59 (1960).
218. United States v. Ginyard, 16 C.M.A. 512, 515. 37 C.M.R. 132, 135 (1967).
219. Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of Staff Sergeant Smith, a drill segeant assigned
to a basic training company at Camp Swampy. He has eight years' service and recently reenlisted
prior to his normal discharge date to qualify for certain specialized schooling. In addition, he
received a handsome reenlistment bonus. Shortly after the reenlistment ceremony. Sergeant Smith's
commanding officer became aware of conduct by Sergeant Smith in violation of a lawful general
regulation. Sergeant Smith had, in his "zeal" to train the volunteers in today's Army, "sold" passing
scores on the physical fitness and rifle qualification tests, subjected several trainees to various forms
of prohibited mental and physical harrassment, and had exhibited considerable favoritism toward
other trainees by purchasing alcoholic beverages for them, as well as giving them preferential
treatment on guard detail and other duty assignments. After investigation, the commander preferred
charges against Sergeant Smith for violation of the regulation. U.C.M.J. art. 92. The offenses were,
of course, committed prior to Sergeant Smith's discharge and reenlistment and had not continued
into the current enlistment. Article92 carries a maximum punishment of twoyears* confinement and,
therefore, fails one prong of the Article 3tat requirement. thus barring prosecution of the charges.
Some of the conduct may be chargeable as assault. id. art. 128, extortion, id. art. 127, or accepting a
bribe, id. art. 134. Those offenses, however, also fail to meet the five-year punishment limitations of
Article 3(a). As a result, Sergeant Smith will retain his rank, privileges, and benefits, not the least of
which is the reenlistment bonus and the guarantee to attend his requested school. Meanwhile, the
Army remains powerless to take disciplinary action that, under the circumstances, would seem
warranted. Of course, some of the conduct engaged in by Sergeant Smith, inaY be cognizable by the
civilian courts. See note 22, supra. In all likelihood, however.the civilian prosecutors will be less than
enthusiastic in spending their money, time, and effort to prosecute an offense which has a negligible
impact upon the immediate civilian community. The needs of the military to discipline and correct
such conduct simply do not carry great weight with the overworked and understaffed civilian
criminal justice system.
The recent case of United States v. Gladue, 4 M.J. I (C.M.A. 1977). presents another example of
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the Ginyard rule: (1) a direct attack in the courts to judicially overrule
the case, or (2) overrule it legislatively.120
For the trial counsel arguing before the trial judge, the chances for
success are, even optimistically speaking, limited. The trial judge is
the bizarre and unsatisfactory results that are produced by the Giiirard rule. In Gladue the accused
was court-martialed for possession of heroin and for conspiracy to smuggle heroin into the United
States on a military aircraft in violation of U.C.M.J. art. 134 and U.C.M.J. art. 81, respectively.
Sergeant Gladue argued that a discharge on January 20.1975, and an immediate reenlistment on the
following day precluded the Air Force from exercising jurisdiction over the possession offense since
it had occured during his prior enlistment. Id. at 3. In resolving the jurisdictional issue, the court cited
Ginvard for the proposition that for jurisdiction to survive an intervening discharge, the offense must
be punishable by more than five years confinement and not triable in the courts of the United States,
or of a state, territory, or the District of Columbia. Id. The defense argued that the federal criminal
laws prohibiting possession of heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1976), had an extraterritorial application and
the accused was, therefore, triable in a district court of the United States. The court, however, found
that the statute did not have extraterritorial application and, therefore, one prong of the Gini'ard test
was satisfied. United States v. Gladue. 4 M.J. 1. 4 (C.M.A. 1977). The court also noted that the
accused was charged under U.C.M.J. art. 134 which carries a maximum punishment of ten years'
confinement, thus fulfilling the other aspect of the Ginyard rule for continuing jurisdiction.
The court's language in finding that the punishment requirement of Article 3ta) was met. however.
warrants careful scrutiny. The court found that the five-year punishment requirement was satisfied
because.
at the time of the appellants court-martial the offense of wrongful possession of heroin
was punishable under Article 134, UCMJ. by confinement at hard labor for 10 years. Para-
graph 127c. Manual for Courts-Martial. United States, 1969 (revised edition). But see United
tates v. Jackson. 3 M.J. 101 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. CourtneY, I M.J. 438 (1976).
Id. (emphasis added). The court's citation to United States v. Courtnet and to United States v.
Jackson indicates contrary results on similar facts in future cases. In Courtnev the accused was
charged under Article 134 for possession of marijuana. The charging of possession of drugs under
Article 134 was challenged by the defense as a violation of equal protection under the fifth
amendment in that the same offense was chargeable as a violation of a general regulation under
Article 92. and, as such. carried a maximum confinement period of only two years. The court found
that "drug offenses punished by the Army under Article 92. UCMJ. Iwerel virtually identical with
those punished under Article 134, UCMJ' United States v. Courtney, I M.J. 438, 440 C.M.A. 1976),
and concluded that the denial of the motion to limit the maximum punishment to two years as
provided by Article 92 was a denial of equal protection. Id. at 442. The Jackson case held that
Courtne' would be applied only to those cases brought to trial after the Courtne ' decision was
published. The citation in Gladue to Courtnei' and Jackson clearly indicates that had Gladue been
tried after Courtne, there would have been no jurisdiction over the possession offense since the two-
year punishment provision of Article 92 would have been applied and the Article 31a) requirement of
five years' confinement would not have been satisfied. Of course, the equal protection problem in
Courtne' has been cured by recent policy changes directing that possession of heroin and certain
other narcotics will be charged under Article 134. while possession of marijuana, LSD. and other
non-narcotic dangerous drugs will only be charged under Article 92. See. e.g. A.R. 600-50. para. 5-2(Oct. 20. 1977). C. A.F.R. 30-2, para. 4-4 (Nov. 8. 1976) (similar to the Army rule except that
marijuana is chargeable under U.C.M.J. art. 134 and has a five-year punishment limitation). Curing
the equal protection problem does not, however, avoid the Gin vard rule with respect to those
offenses chargeable under Article 92 with its two-year punishment limitation. If a Gladue situation
presented itself today and the drug involved was LSD instead of heroin, the proper charge would be a
violation of Article 92 and the service would be without jurisdiction over the possession offense.
hardly a desirable state of affairs.
As discussed in note 217, supra, jurisdiction over the conspiracy charge would continue into the
current enlistment as long as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the current
enlistment. United States v. Gladue. 4 M.J. 1. 5 (C.M.A. 1977).
220. Since court-martial jurisdiction cannot be exercised without a grant of congressional authority.
changes in service regulations or the Manualfior Courts-Martial would be ineffective. Hirshberg v.
Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949). It should be noted, however, that pursuant to U.C.M.J. art. 56 the
President could raise the maximum punishment of all offenses to five years and retain jurisdiction
over some offenses that are presently excluded by Ginyrard. Such a course of action would result in
punishment limitations being devices for jurisdictional purposes rather than being related to the
seriousness of the offense. It hardly seems fair to subject a soldier to the possibility of a five-year
prison sentence for breaking restriction (Article 134) in order to preserve jurisdiction over an
individual who has reenlisted. The seriousness of the offense, not jurisdiction, should govern the
punishments allowable under the Code: for this reason the use of Article 56 should not be considered
as a method of vitiating the Ginrard holding.
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bound by the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals and will be
very reluctant to rule in a manner that is contrary to established pre-
cedent. The defense counsel will counter the Government's evidence
of congressional intent with the fact that Ginyard has been the law for
ten years and the failure of Congress to overrule it ratifies the correctness
of the decision. In overcoming these obstacles, it should be noted that
the development of law by judicial decision, which includes overruling
prior decisions, is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence and is the
very essence of the common law. Therefore, a trial judge should have
no qualms about abandoning the law of a prior case when presented
with sufficient evidence that the case was wrongly decided. The
argument that legislative inaction ratified the court's decision is, like
the Government's evidence, merely an aid to statutory construction
and not dispositive of the issue.2"'
Assuming the Government's argument carries the day at trial, the
issue must, of course, be argued on appeal. If the issue reaches the
Court of Military Review, the Court of Military Appeals will have an
opportunity to review the viability of Ginyard through either a petition
by the accused or a certification by the appropriate Judge Advocate
General.2" In view of the fact that the present court has never had
occasion to hear the issue, a well-briefed and argued case by the
Government may be successful. In any event, one will never know
unless the attempt is made.
In pursuing the other method of attack on Ginyard, the following
legislation is proposed. Article 3(a) should be repealed. In its place the
following should be enacted:
Subject to section 843 of this title (Article 43) no person who cpmmits
an offense against this chapter, while in a status in which such person
was subject to this chapter, shall be relieved from amenability to trial
by court-martial by reason of the termination of that status if such
person is in a status subject to this chapter at the time of trial.
This provision would allow the exercise of jurisdiction over an
individual if he were in the service at the time of the offense, and at the
time of trial, regardless of any intervening discharge. This would avoid
a Ginyard situation as well as a Frayer situation, where the discharge
came at the expiration of the term of service. It would also cover the
221. The -legislative inaction" argument disregards the realities of the political and Iegislative
process and may be slipping from favor in certain areas. See SUTHERLAND. supra note 216, § 49.10. Of
interest to the Article 3(a) tssue is the fact that Judge Latimer relied on this very argument to justify
his theory of applying pre-Code law to determine when status terminated under the Code. See note
37. supra.
222. U.C.M.J. art. 67(b)(2). (3): 10 U.S.C.§§867(b)(2). (3) (19761. Such an opportunity presented
itself to The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force in December 1976 when the Air Force Court
of Military Review followed the Ginvard rule in United States v. Justice, 2 M.J. 344 (A.F.C.M.R.
1976). affd on reconsideration. 2 M.J. 623(A.F.C.M.R. 1977). The issue was not. however, certified
by the Air Force Judge Advocate General to the Court of Military Appeals.
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case where the individual actually left the service and subsequently
reenlisted. The statute of limitations would, however, continue to
run.223 The above proposal does not limit prosecution to serious offenses,
but would allow prosecution, subject to the statute of limitations, for
any offense cognizable by the Code. The fact that an offense is made
punishable by the Code is evidence that it is deleterious to discipline
and needs to be dealt with to maintain the morale, discipline, and the
effectiveness of the armed forces. The proposed legislation also eliminates
the civilian court limitation in the current version of Article 3(a). The
Relford-O'Callahan224 tests for service connection offer sufficient pro-
tections for individuals on active duty to eliminate the need for an
additional qualification in Article 3(a). Since the military is constitutionally
prohibited from exercising court-martial jurisdiction over civilians,225
there is no need for such a limitation for their benefit. The elimination
of the civilian court jurisdiction qualification also avoids the require-
ment that the military judiciary examine and interpret unfamiliar state
and federal law to determine if military jurisdiction exists.
An alternative legislative approach to the Ginyard rule may be
accomplished by enacting the following provision as subsection (c) of
10 U.S.C. § 1168:
Discharge or release from active duty:
(c) Any member of the armed forces qualified for and desiring re-
enlistment in the armed forces, whether at the expiration of the
then current enlistment or pursuant to § 1171 of this title, will
not be discharged, but will enter upon the new term of service as
of the date the enlistment oath is executed. A reenlistment under
such circumstances will be deemed to continue the individual's
status as a member of the armed forces, without interruption, for
all purposes, including, but not limited to, the administration of
military justice.
The above suggested addition to the law governing discharges would
clearly indicate that the "technical" discharges administered in Ginyard
and Frayer, and the accompanying fictional breaks in service, are not
of jurisdictional significance.
There is no rational or logical reason why an individual in the
service at the time of trial should not be held accountable for offenses
committed while in the service. Allowing, as Ginyard does, an individual
to commit various offenses and yet remain in the military and go un-
punished is not only irrational and illogical, but is also an insult to
those honest and hardworking men and women who proudly serve
their nation in the military service.
223. The statute of limitations applicable to offenses under the Code is found in U.C.M.J. art. 43;
10 U.S.C. § 843 (1976).
224. See note 2, supra.
225. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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